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A Review  of Experience
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Divestiture,  often  used as a synonym,  is only one aspect  of pri-
vatization. Bank  involvement  has been  timely and supportive,
but experience  indicates  that  the design  and implementation  of
divestiture  are complex  and time consuming  due to a web of
contextual  and pracdcal  factors.
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This paper  -a  product of the Public Sector Management and Private Sector Development Division,
Country Economics Department-is  part of a largereffortin PRE to (1) review pastefforts in institutional
development, (2) determine where these efforts have succeeded and where they have done poorly, and (3)
suggest how the World Bank and its borrowers can bcttercreate and strengthen an appropriate institutional
framework for economic development. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference on
Institutional Developmentand the World Bank, held in Washington DCin December 1989. Copies of this
paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact
Gloria Orraca-Tetteh, room N9-069, extension 37646 (43 pages with graphs ard  tables).
After reviewing Bank support for divestiture in  overemphasis on divestiture.  Ownership
70 operations in 35 countries, Kikeri concludes  changes are only one element of broader PE
that divestiture operations are best tailored to  reform, the implementation of which could
country conditions.  Other conclusions reached  create a better climate for divestiture later.  And
in this review of Bank experience:  the threat of divestitu-e could improve PE
efficicncy.
Sometimes divestiture yields minimal
results.  For example, small and medium-sized  The Bank could assist by spelling out the
public enterprises (PEs) may be divested,  institutional set-up for managing divestiture.
reducing the government's burden (and increas-  Some guiding principles:  avoid overbure-ucrati-
ing revenues) little; partial divestments may  zation by limiting the number of institutions
mean continued governmert interference;  involved; ensure quick access to top decision-
governments may assume liabilities higher than  makers; make available the necessary technical
the sale price; or new investors may be given  expertise; set up guidelines for the disposition
privileges and monopoly rights that produce  process.  Kikeri describes how the Bank can
more inefficiency,  Kikeri spells out appropriate  help as countries progress to more complex
critcria and methods for better divestiture design  divestitures.
and implementation.
Meanwhile, divestiture can be staff-inten-
Sometimes (especially in Sub-Saharan  sive where the program is large - and Bank
Africa) the best policy may be to improve the  staff shortages must be addressed at the manage-
environment in which PEs function, avoiding an  ment level.
The PRE Working Paper Scries disseminates the findings of work undcr way in the Bank's Policy, Research. and Exicmal
Afrairs Complex.  An objcctive of the  series  is to get these findings  out  quickly, even  if presentations  are  less than  fully
polished. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not neccssarily represent official Bank policy.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
A.  OBJECTIVES
1.  The terms  "divestiture"  and  "privatization"  have  come to  be used
interchangeably.  This  paper  draws  a  distinction  between  the  two  and focusses
on the  former.  A narrower  concept  than  privatization,  divestiture  is defined
as: (i)  the  partial  or full  transfer  of ownership  and/or  control  of public
enterprises  (PEs)  to the  private  sector;  and (ii)  closures  and liquidations  of
PEs.  Other  aspects  of privatization  --  such  as economic  and  indus.trial
liberalization,  the  deregulation  of  natural  and  de facto  monopolies,  and the
contracting  out  of the  delivery  of  public  services  to the  private  sector  --
are  not  dealt  with in this  paper,  but  are treated  separately  in  ongoing  work
on private  sector  development  in the  World  Ban'.'s  Country  Economics
Department.
2.  Policy  makers  in  countries  with  widely  differing  political  and
economic  systems  have  begun  to shift  development  strategies  away from  state
ownership  and  control  to a greater  reliance  on market  forces.  Stemming  largely
from  growing  public  finance  pressures  and  the  continued  poor  performance  of
many  PEs,  the  Bank  has responded  to these  changing  strategies  by supporting
the  divestiture  of state-owned  companies  in as many  as 70  operations  in  35
countries,  as of June  1989.  Divestiture  is  a condition  in  at least  45 policy-
based  loans;  a number  (25)  of  companion  technical  assistance  loans  and  public
enterprise  loans  also  provide  institutional  support  for  the  preparation  and
execution  of such  reform.  Bank  involvement  has  been timely  and supportive  of
the  growing  divestments  to date.  However,  recent  experience  indicates  that  the
design  and implementation  of  divestiture  have  been  more  complex  and  time-
consuming  than  anticipated,  and that  the  efficiency  and  fiscal  gains
potentially  arising  from  such  reform  have not  been fully  realized  due  to a
combination  of practical  and  contextual  factors.
3.  In light  of the  growing  Bank involvement,  the  objectives  of this
paper  are  to: (i)  describe  the  rationale  for  and  key  components  of Bank
support  for  divestiture;  (ii)  examine  the  documented  experiences  and  reform
outcomes,  and  highlight  the  key implementation  and  management  issues  facing
I  would like  to thank  Mary Shirley  and  John  Nellis  for their  valuable
comments  and inputs  in the  preparation  of the  paper.  Several  other  Bank  staff
also  made  helpful  contributions  over  the  various  review  stages  of the  paper.
2  The distinction  is based  on the one  proposed  by Elliot  Berg and  Mary
Shirley,  in  Divestiture  in  Develo2ing  Countries,  World  Bank  Discussion  Paper  11,
June 1987.-2-
borrower  governments  and  the  Bank;  and (iii)  draw some  conclusions  for  the
future  role  of the  Bank  in this  reform  area.
B.  METHODOLOGY
4.  The  review  concentrates  on lending  operations  that  consider
divestiture  in the  context  of the  overall  macroeconomic  adjustment  process  and
the  rationalization  of the  PE sector  as  a whole.  These  include:
(a)  structural  adjustment  loans  (38),  and  a sample
of industry  sector  adjustment  loans  and  export
recovery  loans  (5);
(b)  public  enterprise  loans  (14),  which  include  PE
rationalization/rehabilitation  loans,  PE sector
adjustment  loans,  and  PE institutional  development
loans;
(c)  technical  assistance  loans  (11)..  all  but  one  of
which (Sudan)  are  accompaniments  to SALs;  and
(d)  a small  number  (3)  of private  sector
development  loans  (Table  1; tables  are  provided  at
the  back).
Traditional  investment  projects  that  focus  on the  restructuring  and
divestiture  of individual  enterprises, 3 and  sector  adjustment  loans  that  focus
on the  broader  concept  of privatization,  for  example,  deregulation  of
agricultural  services  are  excluded  from  the  review.  The  decision  to eliminate
these  projects  reflects:  (i)  the  coverage,  in the  present  review,  of the  bulk
of the  Bank's  involvement  in  divestiture;  and (ii)  the  emphasis  on  deriving
the  specific  lessons  of utilizing  divestiture  as  a tool  for  overall  sector
rationalization  and  efficiency  improvements.
5.  The  review  is  a desk  study,  based  on  project  documents
(President's  and  appraisal  reports,  supervision  reports,  and  project
completion  reviews)  and  other  reports  prepared  by Bank  staff  and  consultants.
Interviews  with operational  staff  were  also  held.  On the  whole,  available  data
tend  to focus  on the  number  of  divestments  rather  than  on the  nature  of the
transactions  or the  divestiture  process  itself.  Information  on the
characteristics  of divested  enterprises  are  quite  sparse,  and  systematic
evaluation  of the  financial  and  economic  impact  of ownership  and/or  management
3  Under the  Kingston  Metropolitan  Regional  Urban Project  in Jamaica,  for
example, the bus company was dissolved and franchises  awarded to private
enterprises  for the operation  of the system. In Guinea,  Cote d'Ivoire,  and
Senegal,  Bank  projects  have  addressed  or  are  addressing  the  leasing  ("affermage")
of water services.  And in Malaysia,  full  port operations  were contracted  out
under  Bank  financing.-3-
change  are lacking.  The importance  and  timeliness  of this  topic  demands  a
review  of the  issues,  despite  the  relative  newness  of the  reform  area  for  Bank
lending  and  the  existing  data  constraints. 4
6.  Section  II  of the  review  describes  the  rationale  for  the
increasing  Bank involvement  in  divestiture,  and  presents  the  magnitude  and
nature  of Bank  support.  Section  III  assesses  the  divestiture  experience.
Divestiture  outcomes  are  presented.  The  analysis  focusses  on: (i)  the  process
of divestiture,  including  the  selection  of a strategy,  choice  of candidates
and  modalities,  institutional  arrangements  for  managing  reform,  and  financing
capacities;  and (ii)  selected  operational  or  management  issues  for  the  Bank,
such  as the  timing  and  sequencing  of reform,  the  use  of divestiture
conditionality,  and the  monitoring  and  evaluation  of reform.  Section  IV  offers
conclusions  for  the  future  role  of the  Bank in  divestiture.
II.  OVERVIEW  OF BANK  LENDING  FOR  DIVESTITURE
A. RATIONALE  FOR  DIVESTITURE 5
7.  Member  governments  and  the  Bank  have  utilized  divestiture  as a
tool  of PE reform  for  many different  reasons.  The first  and  most frequently
cited  objective,  particularly  in the  countries  of sub-Saharan  Africa,  is to
rationalize  the  size  of overextended  and  poorly  performing  PE sectors  in  order
to reduce  the  financial  and  administrative  pressures  on governments.  The
closure  of inefficient  and  loss-making  PEs  and  the  divestment  of those  where
state  participation  is no longer  essential  are  measures  to  reduce  the  flow  of
scarce  financial  and  managerial  resources  to such  PEs.  These  savings,  combined
4  Several  Bank-wide  efforts  are being undertaken  to fill the current
information  gaps.In  FY90-91,  CECPS  will  undertake  a research  project  on the  ex
Dost  performance  of  selected  divested  firms  in  a  sample  of  four  to  six  countries.
As more Bank experience  is accumulated  over time, CECPS will also prepar.e
Guidelines  for Divestiture  in FY91. Follow-up  studies incorporated  in some
operations  (CAR,  Togo,  Mali,  Niger,  and  Philippines  for example)  are recently
resulting,  or will result,  in more  detailed  assessments  of the implementation
process.
5  The factors  leading  governments  to divestiture  have been discussed
previously  in  a number  of other  CECPS  papers  and  are  treated  very  briefly  here.
Among  others,  see  Mary  Shirley,  The  Reform  of State-Owned  Enterorises:  Lessons
from  World  Bank  Lending,  PRS  4,  World  Bank,  1989;  John  Nellis,  Public  Enterorise
Reform  in  Adjustment  Lending,  PPR,  WPS  233,  August  1989;  John  Nellis  and  Sunita
Kikeri, "Public  Enterprise  Reform:  Privatization  and the World Bank,"  World
DeveloRment,  Vol.17,  No.5,  May  1989:  Ahmed  Galal,  Ex-Post  Performance  of  Divested
Enterprises,  Research  Proposal,  May 1989.-4-
with revenues  from  the  divestment  of PEs,  can then  be utilized  more
productively  to improve  the  performance  of critical  PEs  and  other  economic
sectors.  Second,  divestiture  is  viewed  as a tool  to improve  PE efficiency. 6
Although  the  causal  link  between  ownership  and  efficiency  has  not  been clearly
established,  it is argued  that  private  owners  and  managers  would increase
efficiency  by virtue  of the  incentives  provided  by clearer  and "atomized"
property  rights  systems,  and  other  factors  such  as less  political
interference,  a  hard  budget  constraint  and the  risk  of effective  bankruptcy,
and  evaluation  on the  basis  of commercial  profitability  by self-interested
shareholders.7
8.  A variety  of other  factors  have  also  led  policy  makers  to accord
greater  prominence  to divestiture,  including:  its  potential  role  ill  fostering
entrepreneurship  and  capital  market  development;  the  relatively  limited  impact
of past  enterprise-level  reform  efforts  short  of ownership  change;  the
demonstration  effects  of  widespread  divestiture  efforts  in  industrialized
countries;  and its  role  in reducing  the  foreign  debt  of the  country,
particularly  where  new  owners  assume  the  foreign  debts  of the  PE,  or  where
divestment  takes  place  through  debt/equity  swaps.  Finally,  the  promotion  of
"popular  capitalism"  and the  widespread  distribution  of  ownership  have  also
been  motivating  factors  for  many  governments.
B.  MAGNITUDE  AND  NATURE  OF BANK  LENDING  FOR  DIVESTITURE
9.  Between  1983  and  June 1989,  71 approved  operations  in 35
countries  contained  divestiture  components  (Table  2).8  Bank  involvement  is,  on
the  whole,  relatively  recent:  approximately  60%  of the  operations  were
approved  in 1987  or later;  24  were  approved  in the  past 18  months  alone
(Graph  1).  Slightly  over  half  of all  operations  are SALs,  eleven  of which  are
supported  by TALs.  Close  to 20%  of all  operations  focus  exclusively  on the  PE
sector,  either  for sector  rationalization/rehabilitation  or  as technical.
assistance  support  for  PE adjustment  operations  (Graph  2).  These  usually
6  The  broader  theoretical  debate  of the  relationship  between  ownership  and
efficiency  has  been  covered  in  other  studies  and  _s  not the  focus  of attention
here.  See Richard Hemming and Ali  M.  Mansoor, Privatization  and Public
Enteriprises,  IMF, OP 56, January 1988; Simon Domberger and John Piggott,
"Privatization  Policies  and  Public  Enterprise:  A Survey,"  The Economic  Record,
June 1986.
7  These  arguments,  however,  hold  better  ground  for the  divestment  of PEs
operating  in competitive  markets  rather  than  monopolistic  environments,  where
a  host  of  other  factors  complicate  the  relationship  between  efficiency  and  change
of ownership.
8  Several  operations  with  divestiture  components  are  under  preparation.
These include  a large  number of SALs in sub-Saharan  Africa; private sector
development  operations  in Benin,  Congo,  Madagascar,  and  Bolivia;  and PERLs  in
Nigeria,  Sri  Lanka,  and  Argentina.provide  more in-depth  assistance  for  divestiture  and  typically  follow  a prior
history  of adjustment  lending.
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10.  The  majority  of the  operations  are  found  in sub-Saharan  Africa
(Graph  3).  Twenty-one  countries  in the  region  account  for  close  to  708  of
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all loans  with  divestiture  components.  Operations  are  concentrated  in  a few
countries,  including  Togo,  Ghana,  Guinea,  Niger,  and  Senegal.  The
preponderance  of Bank involvement  in  Africa  reflects  a  variety  of factors,
including  the  existence  of large,  overextended,  and  loss-making  PE sectors;
pressing  public  finance  and  debt  pressures  in  many  countries;  ready  markets
for  the  divestiture  services  the  Bank  is  most suited  to  provide  (e.g.,
studies);  greater  Rank  leverage  in  the  region;  and  the  availability  of  public
sector  management  staff  in the  Africa  operational  complex.  Prior  to 1987,
Latin  America  (LAC)  was the  only  other  region  with Bank  involvement  in this
field.  To date,  eight  of the  sixteen  approved  operations  in this  region  with
divestiture  components  are  found  in  Jamaica  and  Panama;  Mexico  and  Uruguay
also  have  significant  divestiture  components.  Bank  involvement  in the
remaining  TAC is relatively  minor.  Since  1987,  nine  operations  with
divestiture  components  have  been approved  in the  Europe,  Middle  East  and  North
Africa  (EMENA)  and  Asia regions. 9 The PELs  in  Morocco  and  the  Philippines  are
the  largest  in  scope.  Several  factors  may limit  Bank involvement  in these
regions,  includin7  fewer  policy  based  operations,  greater  country  ability  to
handle  divestiture  programs,  and  resistance  to  external  involvement  in  this
sensitive  area.
11.  The  operations  under  review  provide  different  types  of
divestiture  support. 10 On a global  level,  SALs  help establish  the  policy
dialogue  and  framework  for  reform,  and  release  tranches  against  the
implementation  of specific  divestment  targets.  On a more  specific  level,  the
Bank  supports  three  main  aspects  of divestiture.  (Table  3 provides  a case-by-
case  tabulation).  First,  a large  number  of operations  center  on laying  the
foundations  for  a rethinking  of the  state  policy  on PEs,  and  developing  a
strategy  for  reform.  Some  fifty  operations  in 28 countries  thus  support  PE
studies  and  audits,  classification  exercises,  and  action  plans  which  help: (i)
collect  essential  PE  data  and  assess  viability;  (ii)  decide  which  PEs  should
remain  in  public  hands,  be privatized  (partially  or fully),  or liquidated;  and
(iii)  establish  a time-frame  for  implementation.  Second,  a  number  of
operations  also  provide  institutional  support  to strengthen  government
capacity  for  managing  divestiture.  Some  30 operations  help  define  the
organizational  structure  for implementation,  and  finance  short  and long-term
technical  assistance  for  a variety  of tasks  (asset  valuation,  resolution  of
9  Many countries  have, however,  carried  out or are in the process  of
carrying  out  such  reform  without  direct  Bank  involvement  or  project  assistance.
Bangladesh,  Malaysia,  Thailand,  and  Jordan  are  important  examples.  In  some  cases,
such as Malaysia  and Thailand,  Bank staff  have conducted  analytical  work and
begun  policy  dialogue  on divestiture.
10 Bank support  for divestiture  is usually  employed  in conjunction  with
other  measures  that  aim to improve  the overall  environment  within  which PEs
operate.  These include  policy and institutional  reforms related to credit,
financing,  pricing,  and labor,  and government/PE  relations.  These issues  are
treated  in  a  separate  background  paper.  See  Ahmed  Galal,  Public  Enterprise  Reform
and the  World  Bank:  A2proach.  Practices.  and  Challenges,  November  1989,  CECPS.7-7
legal  matters,  preparation  of the  sale  prospectus,  identification  of partners,
and  establishment  of the  regulatory  framework  after  sale).
12.  Third,  "facilitating"  measures  to  help  prepar3  PEs for
divestiture  and  to  help finance  the  transaction  costs  are  also  covered  in Bank
operations."¶  Minimal  support  is  provided  for  physical  rehabilitation,  which
is usually  left  to the  new investors  for  the  following  reasons:  the  risks  of
inflation  of the  sale  price  and  not  necessarily  the  increase  in the  value  of
the  PE;  the  contraction  of additional  and  potentially  irrecoverable  government
investments-  and/or  a loss  in  government  commitment  to sale  due  to the  new
conditions.i2  Thus,  in  Togo and  Venezuela,  no new investments  are to  be  made
prior  to  divestment;  in the  Philippines,  they  must  be included  in the  annual
investment  budget  and taken  only  where  they  would  lead  to  a justifiable
increase  in  price  and "saleability."  But  several  SALs  and PERLs  support  the
financial  restructuring  of PEs.  While  such  restructuring  is  usually  taken  on a
sector-wide  basis  irrespective  of  divestiture,  some  loans  (such  as those  in
Niger,  Cameroon,  the  CAR,  Congo,  Guinea,  and  Mali)  support  the  restructuring
of PEs specifically  slated  for  divestiture,  including  developing  action  plans
to identify  and  eliminate  their  arrears  and  cross-debts.  While  the  Bank  does
not  provide  direct  financial  support  for  such  restructuring, 13 SAL
counterpart  funds  and  budgetary  resources  have  been  used through  restructuring
funds  to finance  associated  costs.  These  funds  have  also  been  used  to settle
employee  liabilities,  where  termination  has occurred  prior  to  or after
divestiture.
III. AN  ASSESSMENT  OF EXPERIENCE
13.  What  have  been the  quantitative  and  performance  outcomes  of Bank
support  for  divestiture?  What  have  been the  key  problems  and  issues  in
implementation?  What  operational  and  management  issues  emerge  out  of the
Bank's  lending  approach for  divestiture?  These  questions  are  discussed  in the
sections  below.  A few  caveats  are  in  order.  First,  it is  difficult o separate
Bank-supported  actions  from  those  undertaken  by governments  prior  co  or
11  General reforms  supporting  the "commercialization"  of PEs, that are
expected to put PEs on a  sound footing for eventual  divestment,  are not
considered  here.
12  As part of the general  PE restructuring  efforts  in Bank operations,
however,  financing  may  be  made  available  for  the  rehabilitation  of  PEs  that  could
be targets  for  divestiture  in  the  future.
13.  The International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC),  on the other  hand, has
provided  equity  investment  and loans to privatized  companies.  IFC has made
equity investment  in privatized  companies  in Tunisia,  Swaziland,  Mozambique,
Liberia,  Togo, Trinidad  and Tobago and Venezuela.  In addition,  strategic
planning  advice  has  also  been provided  to several  other  countries.-8-
without  Bank  support.  But  as the  data  are  derived  from  loan  documents,  they
are  assumed  to  have  been taken  as part  of the  Bank-supported  adjustment
program.  Second,  preliminary  performance  outcomes  are  available  at this  time.
They  are  presented,  nevertheless,  as the  paper  is intended  to oe a review  of
i.mplementation  experience  rather  than  a rigorous  assessment  of the  benefits
and  costs  of divestiture. 14 Finally,  the  discussion  pertains  to a wide  range
of countries  with sufficient  implementation  experience,  including  the  Congo,
Ghana,  Guinea,  Niger,  Senegal,  Togo,  Jamaica,  Mexico,  Panama,  and the
Philippines.  Thus,  there  is  a possibility  that  a global  review  of t±is  sort
may  mask  the  specific  characteristics  of the  divestiture  program  or
transactions  in  a given  country.
A.  DIVESTITURE  OUTCOMES
14.  The  Ouantitative  Record.  Despite  the  technical  and  political
complexity  of such  reform  (see  below),  the  record  in  terms  of numbers  of
divestments  is  quite  large  in  several  countries. 15 (Quantitative  results  for  a
selected  group  of countries  is  presented  in  Annex  1.)  Jamaica,  Guinea,  Togo,
Mexico,  and the  Philippines  offer  cases  in  point.  Guinea,  for  example,  closed
some  70 publicly  owned  unLts  (although  a large  majority  of these  are  small
retail  outlets;  see  below).  Togc,  Mali,  Madagascar  and  Benin  each liquidated
12 to 15 firms.  And in the  Philippines,  five  government  corporations  have  been
closed.  Several  examples  of ownarship  change  are  also  available.  Jamaica
divested  over  J$500  million  of PE assets,  exceeding  the  loan  tranche  target  of
J$150  million.  Both  Guinea  and  Togo  sold  a significant  number  of industrial
PEs.  In  Mexico,  as of March  1989,  260  fEs  had  been liquidated,  180  sold,  70
merged,  and  25 cransferred  to local  governments.  And in the  Philippines,  26
government  corporations  have  been  sold (10  partially)  at the  time  of  writing.
At the  same time,  countries  such  as Ghana  and  Senegal  have achieved  few
results.
15.  Performance  Outcomes.  Preliminary  findings 15 offer  some  early
insights.  First,  while  the  absolute  number  of enterprises  divested  may  be
quite  large,  the  magnitude  or impact  of these  divestments  in terms  of total  PE
14 Research  on these  issues  is  currently  under  way in CECPS  for  a sample
of four  countries.  See  Ahmed  Calal,  op.  cit.
15 For a survey  of world-wide  divestments,  see Charles  Vuylsteke,  Helen
Nankani,  and Rebecca  Candoy-Sekse,  The Technigues  of Privatization  of State-
Owned  EnterRrises,  Volumes  1, II and III,  World Bank  Technical  Paper  No. 89,
*1988.
16  Data are gathered  from supervision  reports,  President's  Reports,  and
other  Bank  reports.-9-
assets  or budgetary  . ansfers  may  be  relatively  small.  In  Mexico,  for  example,
the  number  of industrial,  energy  and  mining  PEs  under  the  Ministry  of Energy,
Mines  and  Public  Industry  (SEMIP)  were reduced  from  398  to 90 (77%),  but they
represented  23%  of total  SEMIP  assets  (and  an even  smaller  percentage  of total
PE sector  assets)  and  20%  of government  transfers  to SEMIP.  In  Guinea,  the
bulk of the  70 liquidations  represented  small  and  non-operating  retail
outlets.  And in the  Philippines,  twenty-seven  of the  121  government
corporations  slated  for  privatization  have  been  completed,  although  several  of
them  are  partial  divestments  or divestments  of non-operating  assets  (some  big
divestments  have,  however,  been completed).
16.  Second,  anecdotal  bits of information  signal  some  performance
improvements.  In  Jamaica,  for  example,  the  divestiture  of the  telephone
holding  company  led  to  a 55  percent  increase  in outgoing  international  calls.
In  Mexico,  the  divested  petrochemical  companies  increased  investments  by 75%
of gross  sales  revenues  in  a three-year  period;  and  turn-over  ratios
increased.  In the  auto  parts  industry,  divestiture  led  to increased
technological  development  and  capacity  utilization,  overall  cost  reductions,
and  b:.tter  management.  However,  these  performance  gains  must  be balanced
against  other  findings.  Monopoly  rights  and  other  special  privileges  raise
questions  about  the impact  on economic  efficiency  in some  cases  (see  below).
Moreover,  the  effects  of partial  divestiture  must also  be considered. 17 The
divestment  of majority  shareholding  through  a  joint  venture  or other
techniques  involving  a strong  technical  partner,  partial  divestment  can  be a
useful  first  step in improving  efficiency. 18 But  the  divestment  of minority
shareholdirng  can lead  to few  changes  in  managerial  behavior  and  operational
performance.  Although  not  included  in the  review,  the  case  of Bangladesh  is
instructive.  Government  policy  of divesting  49%  of selected  manufacturing
enterprises  --  through  a combination  of public  share  offerings  and  employee
participation schemes --  led to increased revenues and widened share
ownership,  both important  divestiture  objectives.  However,  managerial
17 Some  operations  support  the  partial  divestiture  of  enterprises  that  are
to remain in the public sector  in the medium to long term. These are not
considered  here.  The Philippines  PERL includes  the  sale  of tankers  in the  oil
corporation,  the  use  of build-operate-transfer  schemes  to generate  power,  and
the  hiving  off of assets  of other  government  corporations.  The Jamaica  PERL
supported  partial  divestments  in the  transport  sector,  including  shipping  and
railways.  Examples  can  also  be found  of  ports  and  transport  companies  in  Guinea
and  the  Congo.
18  An analysis  of this strategy  would be highly worthwhile  given its
popularity,  and  could  be conducted  in  the  case  of Guinea,  the  Philippines,  and
the  Congo.  In  Guinea,  for  example,  eleven  of  twenty-three  industrial  divestments
involved  majority foreign participation,  with the remaining share capital
distributed  between private Guir._an  investors  and the government.  In the
Philippines,  ten of the twenty-seven  privatizations  have been partial,  with
government  retaining  minority  participation,  in the social  security  system,
energy,  shipping,  and  banking  sectors.  And in the  Congo,  opening  of the  share
capital  of  twelve  enterprises  resulted  in  majority  private  ownership.  Presumably
management  control  was  also transferred  to the  private  sector.-10-
performance  and  operational  efficiency  remained  unaffected  as  majority
ow,ership  allowed  government  interference  to continue.
17.  Third,  data  on gross  proceeds  are  becoming  available. 19 While
these  may  be large  in some  cases  (Mexico,  Philippines,  for  example),  the  net
financial  gain  for  most  governments  can  be small  for  several  reasons:  sale,  to
date,  of the  smaller,  low-value  enterprises;  the  assumption  of the  domestic
and  foreign  debt,  which  often  outweigh  the  market  value  of the  assets,  by the
governments  in  most  cases;  the  valuation  of enterprises  without  clear
methodology;  and the  use  of proceeds  to pay  large  amounts  of severance,
particularly  where  overemployment  required  significant  retrenchment.
18.  Factors  leading  to these  divestiture  outcomes  are discussed
below.  As will  be shown,  policical  will and  country  conditions  are  no doubt
important, 20 but practical  issues  related  to the  process  of divestiture,  the
institutional  capacity  to execute  the  program  in  an effective  and transparent
manner,  and the  sequencing  of divestiture  with  other  reform  areas  are  also
critical.
B.  PRACTICAL  ISSUES  IN IMPLEMENTATION
L.  Formulation  of a Strateev:  A Sector-Wide  vs Case-by-Case  ADoroach
19.  Sector-_ide  Approach The sector-wide  approach  is  used  when
rationalization  of the  size  of the  PE sector  is the  major  divestiture
objective.  The  majority  of the  operations  under  review  --  such  as in the
19  Some data on gross procoeds  are becoming  available.  In Mexico.  for
instance,  136  transactions  raised  Mex$  796.3  billion  (US$  765  million);  and  three
large  transactions  in  late  1988  generated  an  additional  US$  1.8  billion  in  gro!;s
revenues.  In  Togo,  ten  privatizations  yielded  direct  revenues  to the  governme1t
of CFAF  230  million  from  the  sale  of  shares  and  CFAF  1,339  million  annually  from
the leases  of privatized  companies.  The lease arrangements  on some of Air
Jamaica's  equipment  resulted  in  a net  foreign  cash flow  improvement  of US$4.58
million  in  FY87/88.  In  Guinea,  the  privatization  of  cement,  beer  and  central  oils
alone raised approximately  CFAF 8.2 million. And in the Philippines,  the
divestments  to  date  have raised  approximately  Pesos  1.2  billion.
20 Broad country factors --  such as the  nature of the  political system and
varying  macroeconomic  environments  --  have  no doubt  been influential;  and they
have  been  dealt  with in  a  number  of  other  studies.  See  Simon  Commander  and  Tony
Killick,  "Privatization  in  Developing  Countries:  A  Survey  of  the  Issues,'  in  Paul
Cook  and  Colin  Kirkpatrick,  eds.,  Privatization  in  Less  Developed  Countries,  New
York, 1988;  N. N. Susungi,  The Caveats  on Privatization  as an Instrument  of
Scructural  Adiustment  in  Africa,  African  Development  Bank  Research  Paper,  Cote
d'Ivoire,  1988; Samuel  Paul, Privatization  and the Public Sector:  Emerging
Issues,  CECPS,  November  1987;-11-
Congo,  Guinea,  Mali,  Senegal,  Togo,  Tunisia,  Morocco,  and  the  Philippines  --
employ  such  an approach.  The  classification  exercise  provides  a useful
operational  tool  in  helping  governments  confront  the  policy  issue  of which
activities  should  continue  to  remain  in the  public  sector,  and  which  should  be
turned  over  to the  private  sector  or liquidated.  Action  plans  are then
established,  either  for  individual  PEs  or the  sector  as  a whole,  followed  by
implementation.
20.  The  major  advantage  of the  sector-wide  approach  is that  it
addresses  the  fundamental  question  of  a reorientation  of the  state's  role in
economic  activities.  But the  potential  political  and  technical  constraints  of
this  approach  must  also  be considered.  In  most  developing  countries,  natural
and  de facto  monopolies  and  other  "strategic"  PEs (such  as utilities,
railroads,  telecommunications,  postal  services,  mining  companies,  for  example)
are  usually 21 retained  in  the  public  sector  due  to  economies  of scale,  weak
regulatory  capacity,  and/or  social  welfare  and  defense  concerns.  Leaving  these
aside,  cost/benefit  analyses  and  viability  assessments  would,  on economic
grounds,  indicate  that  among  the  commercial  enterprises  operating  in
competitive  markets  the  viable  (or  potentially  viable)  ones  be classified  for
privatization;  and  the  inefficient,  financially  insolvent,  and  unviable  ones
--  i.e.  those  which  perhaps  should  never  have  been  created  in the  first
place --  be classified for liquidation.
21.  In  practice,  however,  governments  hav3 often  deviated  from  a
classification  based  only  on economic  criteria.  This  may  be due to:  (i)  the
multiplicity  of PE objectives;  (ii)  the  large  number  of actors  involved  in the
decision-making  process;  and (iii)  the  sharing  among  many  different  groups  of
the  costs  and  benefits  of divestiture. 22 Socio-political  factors  --  such  as
employment  generation,  regional  equity,  and  the  continued  provision  of goods
at low  prices  --  are thus  frequently  considered,  leading  governments  to make
certain  trade-offs:  to  retain  firms  that  are  politically  strategic  though
economically  unviable;  or to attempt  the  sale  rather  than  closure  of unviable
firms,  given  the  employment  ramifications  of the  latter.  While  the  economic
costs  to the  society  as a  whole  of continuing  to  keep inefficient  firms  alive
can  be high,  governments  make  these  trade-offs  to improve  the  political
feasibility  of undertaking  divestiture.  These  issues  may  require  a certain
amount  of flexibility  in  cases  that  are  particularly  sensitive.  The  case  of
the  cement  plant  (SNC)  in  Niger  under  SAL  I is illustrative.  The  government
was  proposing  a large  new  investment  for  the  plant  that,  on technical  grounds,
was inherently  unviable  and  therefore  suited  for  liquidation.  On the  basis  of
demonstrations  of the  substantial  economic  costs  of making  the  new  investment,
and  on the  basis  of the  prevailing  political  pressures,  a decision  was taken
21 But  not  always.  For  example,  the  governments  of  Mexico,  Argentina,  and
Sri  Lanka  are consideritig  proposals  to divest  their  telecommunications  firms,
while  mining  companies  are  to  privatized  in the  Philippines  .
22  For  a detailed  discussion  of these  points,  see  The  Political  Economy  of
Public Enterprise  Divestiture:  A Benefit/Cost  Approach,  by Leroy Jones, P.
Tandon,  and I.  Vogelsang,  Draft,  June 1989.-12-
to  drop the  new investment  but to  allow  the  plant  to remain  in operation  as
long  as it  covered  its  variable  costs.
22.  The process  of classifying  the  PE sector  at once  can  also  be
technically  and  administratively  demanding,  particularly  where  data  scarcities
are severe  and  where  the  sector  is  relatively  large.  While  it is true  that  a
number  of PEs  can  be easily  classified  without  detailed  analysis,  several  PEs
may require  careful  viab;lity  assessments  prior  to reaching  a decision.  Many
of the  developing  countries  lack  the  data  or the  technical  resources  required
for  such  analyses.
23.  Given  the  political  nature  of the  sector-wide  approach,  and  the
potential  technical  difficulties,  classification  can  be a two-year  process.
Where  government  commitment  is  high  or  where  a relatively  small  number  of
enterprises  are  to  be classified,  the  process  has,  howev,r,  been shorter
(Niger  and the  Congo,  for  example).  And  where  ideological  and  political
factors  have  been  particularly  prevalent,  or  where  the  sector  has  been
particularly  large,  the  process  has  been longer  (four  years  in Senegal;  three
years  in the  Philippines).
24.  Greater  emphasis  may  be placed  on reaching  agreement  with
governments  on the  criteria  or broad  principles  of  classification,  rather  than
on the  nuts  and  bolts  of the  classification  itself.  A strong  argument  in favor
of this  is the  fact  that  classifications  change  over time,  as a result  of
changing  political,  economic,  and  enterprise  conditions,  or as a result  of
previously  ill-conceived  decisions.  In the  Philippines,  for  example,  several
reconsiderations  have  been  made in  the  original  classification.  The first
classification  in  Togo resulted  in the  retention  of a large  number  of
financial  institutions  and  commercial  PEs;  this  was subsequently  modified  to
classify  them  for  divestiture.  Similar  instances  have  prevailed  in  other
countries.  In  short,  precious  time  and  effort  may  be wasted  on reaching
agreement  on a full  classification,  only  to  have it changed  the  next time
around.
25.  Case-by-Case  ARDroach.  A few  operations  --  in Panama,  Hox.-'uras,
Costa  Rica  and  Malawi,  for  example  --  focus  on  a case-by-case  approach  to
divestiture,  selecting  individual  PEs  for  divestment  without  directly
considering  the  rationalization  of the  PE sector  as a whole.  The  case-by-case
approach  has the  advantage  of easily  and  quickly  targeting  critical  PEs  for
divestiture  without  going  through  a  potentially  lengthy  and  controversial
classification  exercise.  The  choice  of PEs  is  particularly  important.  Where
big and important  PEs  are  selected  for  divestment,  such  an approach  can lead
to significant  efficiency  and  fiscal  gains.  Where  the  enterprises  selected  are
small  and  marginal,  an over-emphasis  on a case-by-case  approach,  without
addressing  the  underlying  issues  of sector  rationalization  or overall
efficiency  improvements,  can  yield  minimal  benefits.  In  Panama,  for  example,
five  smaller  PEs  were selected  for  divestiture.  Similar  experiences  in  Benin
and  Gabon  led to  the follow-up  of case-by-case  approach  with  a more  global
divestiture  strategy.-13-
26.  A Combined  Approach.  Some  Bank  projects  proceed  with
classification  and  case-by-case  implementation  simultaneously,  recognizing
that  governments  need  not  wait to complete  the  accounting  for  the  entire
sector  before  it  begins  with  the  divestment  of individual  PEs.  The strategy  of
treating  sector-wide  rationalizations  as  a longer-term  exercise,  with
operational  targets  focussing  on the  immediate  divestment  of carefully
selected,  priority  candidates,  is  both  operationally  expeditious  and  outcomes
oriented.  The  Jamaica  PE loan,  for  example,  successfully  employed  such  an
approach.  The immediate  divestment  of PEs  (among  them  Air  Jamaica,  Jamaica
Broadcasting  System,  a shipping  company,  and  a few  smaller  enterprises)
carefully  selected  to  obtain  short-term  fiscal  relief  was supported  under  the
loan,  although  within  the  context  of a longer-term  strategy  to consolidate  and
classify  the  entire  sector  for  future  rationalization.
2.  The Process  of Divestiture
27.  Selection  and  Sequencing  of Candidates.  The  selection  of the
initial  candidates  is  critical  to the  success  of the  divestiture  program.  The
most logical  and  expedient  approach  is to  begin implementation  with the
divestment  of commercial  PEs  operating  in  competitive  markets,  while  leaving
the  more  complex  cases  (quasi  or full  monopolies)  for  the  second  stage.  The
reasons  for  this  are  many:  (i)  such  candidates  offer  greater  chances  of
initial  success,  a critical  factor  for  the  future  of the  divestiture  program;
(ii)  the  divestments  are  technically  relatively  simple,  providing  a useful
learning  curve  for  governments;  and (iii)  they  avoid  complex  regulatory  and
distributional  issues.  Viable  and  profitable  candidates,  in turn,  are likely
to  have the  greatest  chances  of success.  The  strategy  of selecting  "winners"
as first  candidates  paid  off  in the  Philippines,  for  example,  where  the  early
divestment  of banks  and  real  estate  companies  provided  an impetus  to the
program.  Similarly,  early  successes  were  registered  in  Guinea  and  Togo  by the
divestment  of beer,  cement  and  airline  companies  have  elicited  the  desired
supply  response  and  fetched  a good  price.
28.  Nevertheless,  some  countries,  especially  those  experiencing
implementation  problems,  display  the  tendency  of selecting  the  smaller  and
less  attractive  PEs  for  immediate  sale.  Senegal,  Morocco,  and  Ghana  are
examples  where  ideological  and  socio-political  factors,  and  the  reluctance  to
privatize  firms  which  generate  revenues  for  the  government,  affected  the
choice  of initial  candidates  and  delayed  implementation.  In  Senegal,  the  more
interesting  firms  were excluded  from  the  divestiture  list.  Moreover,  the
selectod  candidates  '26)  represented  only  2%  of state  participation  in the
sector.  In  Morocco,  only  three  of the  106  PEs  classified  for  divestiture  weie
selected  for immediate  sale;  several  competitive  or potentially  competitive-14-
PEs  in construction  and transport  remained  in  the  public  portfolio. 23 The
selection  of the  smaller  and  practically  defunct  PEs  for  liquidation  is  also
evident  in some  countries.  In  Guinea,  the  large  majority  of the  70 liquidated
PEs  were non-operating  retail  outlets.  In  Mali,  the  CAR and  Congo,  the  closed
PEs  represented  small  bookstores,  yogurt  factories,  and  banks.
29.  Poor  sequencing  of divestiture  candidates  can  lead  to  negative
results.  First,  potential  investors  may demonstrate  little  interest  in
acquiring  unviable  and  loss-making  PEs,  delaying  the  pace  of the  program.  Or
purchasers  are interested  in  only  buying  them  with  concessions  and special
privileges  that  produce  efficiency-limiting  distortions  in the  long  run (see
below).  Second,  PEs  in  poor  condition  could  require  prior  restructuring  if  a
good  price  is to  be achieved.  This takes  time  and  money.  Third,  the  net  costs
of selling  inefficient  PEs  as going  concerns,  when in fact  they  should  have
been liquidated  and assets  disposed  separately,  can  be high in terms  of time
spent  in arranging  satisfactory  sale  or  management  contracts  for  firms  in  poor
condition,  the  future  viability  of the  operation  and  continued  government
bail-outs,  and the  better  use  of resources  elsewhere  in the  economy.  Finally,
the  expected  fiscal  and  efficiency  gains  are  not likely  to  be derived  from
closing  or selling  the  small  and low-value  PEs  in the  commercial  sector,
although  the  long-term  financial  and  administrative  costs  of keeping  even the
smaller  PEs  alive  justify  their  divestment.
30.  SRocifviniz  Techniques.  Bank  operations  do not specify  in  advance
the  technique  of divestiture,  except  in the  broad  sense  of "liquidations"  and
"privatizations."  The  choice  of divestment  techniques  is thus  left  to the
government.  While  this  is indeed  a good  strategy,  given  the  need for
flexibility  and  consideration  on a case-by-case  basis,  the  lack  of guidance  on
the  broad  criteria  for  selecting  specific  divestiture  options  have led  to
implementation  problems  where  the  fit  between  the  selected  techniques  and
prevailing  country  conditions  is  weak. 24
31.  Governments  propose  or utilize  a variety  of techniques.  Where  an
enterprise  is to  be sold,  sale  as a going  concern  and  public  share  offerings
are  most  frequeu.tly  proposed.  The  latter  is  used  as  a  tool  to  broaden  share
ownership  --  increasing  its  political  attractiveness  --  and  expand  local
capital  markets.  Examples  of  sales  as  going  concerns  are  found  in  most  of  the
countries  under  review  (Panama,  Guinea,  Congo,  Togo,  and  the  Philippines,  for
example).  Public  share  offerings  are  found  in  Jamaica  (National  Commercial
Bank)  and  the  Philippines  (Philippines  National  Bank),  although  they  have  been
carried  out  in  a  large  number  of  countries  not  under  review.
23 At  the  same  time,  a  1989  draft  law  has  been  submitted  by  the  King  for
parliamentary  debate  and  approval;  it  proposes  that  all  but  six  priority  PEs  will
be divested  over time.
24 See  Charles  Vuylsteke,  op.cit,  for  a  detailed  discussion  on the  choice,
requirements  and  uses  of divestiture  techniques.-15-
32.  However,  in  some  sub-Saharan  African  countries,  sale  as a going
concern  may  be difficult  in  view  of weak  local  private  sectors,  government-
imposed  restrictions  on  buyers,  and the  poor  condition  of most  of the  PEs
chosen  for  sale.  In  !.uch  instances,  liquidation  followed  by sale  of assets  may
be most  appropriate,  although  governments  have sought  to avoid  this  solution
in the  case  of large  and  operating  PEs  for  political  and  employment  reasons.
The  uLis-fit  between  country  conditions  and  the  politically  preferred  method  of
public  offerings  has also  delayed  implementation  in  a few  instances.  A prime
example  is  Senegal,  where  past insistence  on this  technique,  despite  an
embryotic  capital  market  and  weak  financial  institutions,  poor  financial
performance  and  long-term  prospects  of the  selected  PEs,  and  the  absence  of
technical  expertise,  was one  of the  factors  contributing  to the  lack  of
movement  on the  divestiture  side  of the  PE reform  program.
33.  Where  full  sale  is  difficult  for  whatever  reason,  divestment  of
management  has taken  place  through  the  use of  management  contracts  and
leases. 25 Examples  of the  former  may  be found  in  service  industries  such  as
hotels  and  airlines  in  Togo,  Niger,  Jamaica,  Guinea,  and  the  Congo.  Lease
arrangements  have  been  concluded  in  for  the  dairy  and  steel  mills,  and  an oil
refinery  and  storage  enterprise  in  Togo,  for  example.  Prior  specification
could  be beneficial  in  countries  lacking  the  conditions  for  other  divestiture
techniques,  resulting  in less  time  spent  trying  to  arrange  satisfactory  sales.
Few  operations  specify  franchising  and  the  contracting  out  of services  as
alternatives  to ownership  transfer,  which  may  also  be  viable  options  where
sale  is ruled  out.  Traditional  or sector  specific  projects  may,  however,
contain  such  measures.
34.  Meeting  the  Costs  of Divestiture.  The  costs  entailed  in the
process  of divesting  the  larger  firms  can  be quite  high.  Delays  have  been
encountered  in some  countries  due  to  difficulties  in obtaining  funds  to  pay
creditors;  the  Congo,  Ghana  and  Togo  are  examples.  Where  foreign  debts  are
high,  the  problem  is  even  more  acute.  At the  same  time,  debts  have  often  been
assumed  by the  governments  to  move the  liquidation  or sale  process  ahead  (the
budgetary  costs  are  another  matter).  Employee  liabilities,  however,  must  be
paid,  where  retrenchment  takes  place  prior  to sale (as  most  private  investors
want to  avoid  taking  such  actions  themselves)  or as  a consequence  of
liquidations.  Notwithstanding  the  political  difficulties  of employment
reductions,  the  lack  of  budgetary  resources  for  severance  pay  has  been an
obstacle  in  a few instances.  Ghana  is  a prime  example.  The  cost  of laying-off
5,000  staff  in  28 PEs  amounted  to  approximately  2  billion  cedis  (in  1987).
This large  sum  reflected  the  generous  severance  and  retirement  benefits  for
involuntary  departures  in the  labor  union  agreements  since  public  pension
schemes  are inadequate.  (This  is  a major  labor  issue,  however,  and  not  just a
divestiture  issue).  Combined  with the  fact  that  the  public  pension  programs
were  underfunded,  this  resulted  in  delays  in retrenchment  and  in the  overall
divestiture  program.
25.  See Sven  Hegstad  and Ian  Newport,  Management  Contracts:  Main Features
and  Design  Issues,  World  Bank  Technical  Paper  No.  65,  July 1987.-16-
35.  While  the  Bank  cannot  provide  direct  financial  support  for  the
settlement  of liabilities,  some  countries  have  used SAL  counterpart  funds  (and
funds  from  other  donors)  to  settle  liabilities,  despite  the  reluctance  on the
part  of the  Bank to  use  such funds  for  unproductive  purposes.  Guinea,  Mali,
Sudan,  and  Niger  are  examples.  Other  financing  mechanisms  have  also  been
devised  to  help speed  up the  settlement  of employee  liabilities.  Operations  in
Ghana  and  Madagascar,  for  example,  establish  Divestiture  Accounts  to  handle
the  proceeds  from  the  sale  of assets,  part  of which  goes toward  resolving  PE
liabilities.  However,  the  lack  of seed  money  and  completed  sales  has  meant
that  these  funds  have  remained  empty,  thereby  minimizing  their  effectiveness.
Restructuring  Funds  have  been  set  up to support  severance  payments  in  Mali,
Niger,  Guinea,  Togo,  and  Tunisia,  for  example.  There  is  as yet  no evaluation
of how these  have  worked.
36.  Granting  Special  Privileges.  Monopoly  rights,  favorable
financing  terms,  and  protection  from  imports  have  been  granted  in some
instances.  These&  have  often  been  outside  the  import  tariff  structure  and
investment  code  established  as part  of the  overall  reform  program.  In Guinea,
for  example,  six  of the  fifteen  completed  transactions  accorded  the  purchasers
more favorable  terms  than  those  foreseen  under  the  new Investment  Code.  The
cigarette  manufacturer  received  a monopoly  on both  production  and imports;  the
soft-drinks  company  obtained  an eleven  year  monopoly  on the  sale  of Coca  Cola
and  other  soft  drinks,  plus  a limit  on the  production  of its  competitors;  and
the  match  company  received  a ten  year  monopoly  on production,  with  no minimum
tax  for  fiva  years.  In addition,  subsidized  loans  were granted  to finance
working  capital  needs,  and  assets  were sold  at low  prices  repayable  in  local
currency  without  interest  over  a long-time  period.  In Togo the  leased  steel
mill (STS)  obtained  government  obligations  to  repurchase  at  book value  any  new
investment  made  by the  lessor  during  the  lease  period,  and  duty  free imports
of raw  materials,  machinery  and  equipment.  Similar  concessions  were granted  to
the  other  privatizations  in  Togo as  well.
37.  The issue  of special  privileges  is  a complex  one.  Governments,
deal-makers,  and  purchasers  argue  that  concessions  have  been necessary  to
attract  and  compensate  investors  (both  foreign  and  domestic)  for  high-risk
situations  and  poor asset  conditions  ensure  the  future  profitability  of the
firm,  and  generate  downstream  effects  in the  long-run  by balancing  special
privileges  with special  obligations  (to  support  local  production  of raw
materials  in  Guinea,  for  instance).  But  while  high levels  of protection  can
yield  financial  improvements,  they  rick  creating  new  sources  of economic
inefficiency  and  distortions.  While  it is still  early  to assess  the  full
impact  -- i.e.  whether  private  owners  are  using  the  resources  more
efficiently,  whether  privatization  has led  to greater  competition,  and  whether
prices  have changed  --  the  net  economic  impact  of such  transactions,  and  of
the  poor  balance  between  divestiture  and liberalization,  is  a critical  issue
that  requires  further  study.
38.  Subsequent  bank operations  have  responded  to these  concerns.
Togo SAL  III  and  Guinea  SAL  II call  for  agreement  on a timetable  for
reviews/amendments  of special  privileges  granted  in  previous  deals,  and the
elimination  of  monopoly  and  other  special  privileges  granted  to  privatized-17-
enterprises  beyond  the  provisions  of the  new Investment  Code.  In  Guinea,  a
National  Investment  Commission  has  been  set  up to  ensure  that  future
agreements  remain  within  the  framework  of the  Investment  Code.  The  Commission
will receive  TA from  the  proposed  Second  Economic  Management  project.  More
recent  operations  emphasis  on ex  ante  rather  than  ex post  measures  to  prevent
such  transactions.
3.  Managinj  Divestiture:  Institutional  Arrangements  and  Capacity
39.  Decentralized  vs.  Centralized  Arraneements.  Almost  all  of the
countries  under  review  have  created  high-level  committees  to undertake  the
strategy,  policy  guidance,  approval,  and  monitoring  functions.  These
committees  usually  comprise  of key  ministers  and  representatives  from  other
parts  of the  government  and,  sometimes,  the  private  sector.  Two different
institutional  strategies  for  handling  operational  or implementation  functions
have  been  followed:  delegation  of these  functions  to sector  ministries  and
holding  companies,  or their  centralization  in  a single  focal  point.  In  part,
the  choice  depends  on the  scope  of the  reform  program;  in  part,  it  depends  on
the  prevailing  institutional  set-up  for  PE  reform.
40.  A number  of countries  (such  as  Tunisia,  Guinea,  Uganda,  Panama,
Jamaica,  and  the  Philippines)  have  delegated  these  tasks  to sector  ministries
or  holding  companies  on the  assumption  that  they  are  in the  best  position  to
evaluate  the  condition  of the  PE and  propose  a course  of action,  or given  the
large  scope  of the  program.  In  some  cases,  these  decisions  have  been  de facto,
evolving  from  the  absence  of a central  institutional  set-up  for  overall  PE
reform  or,  conversely,  given  the  strengths  of a  particular  ministry. Such  an
approach  works  well  where  sector  ministries  and  holding  companies  are
committed  to reform,  where  they  have (or  have access  to)  technical  expertise,
and  where  there  is some  central  mechanism  capable  of providing  advice,  support
and  momentum  to the  program.  In  Tunisia,  for  example,  the  process  has
apparently  been  highly  satisfactory,  with  a minimum  of duplication  and time
loss  and  good  guidance  by CAREPP,  the  central  policy  committee.  In the
Philippines,  National  Development  Corporation  moved  rapidly  in  divesting  its
enterprises.  And in  Chile,  the  technical  ability  of  CORFO  (the  holding  company
accounting  for  the  bulk  of state  holdings)  led  to successful  divestment  of a
large  number  of enterprises.  In these  instances,  the  availability  of good
technical  expertise  and  commitment  were  critical  factors  in success.
41.  On the  whole,  however,  the  involvement  of several  different
implementing  units  has  led  to: (i)  unevenness  in  pace  and  approach;  (ii)  the
lack  of consistency  in  deal-making  practices;  (iii)  the  spreading  of scarce
technical  skills  thinly  across  several  implementing  units;  and (iv)
inadequately  specified  lines  of authority  and  institutional  conflicts,  and  the
inadequate  functioning  of the  coordinating  committee.  Moreover,  bureaucratic
and  political  resistance  on the  part  of sector  ministries  to divest  their
portfolios  and thereby  sacrifice  rents,  power,  and  control,  combined  with a
reluctance  of PE  managers  to  assume  greater  responsibility  and  accountability
and  give  up job  security,  have,  in some  instances,  been impeding  factors.  In-18-
short,  vested  interests  and  other  factors  have  hampered  quick  decision-making
and  overall  coordination.
42.  In  Guinea,  for  example,  while  the  Ministry  of Industry  moved
quickly  and  dynamically  to  privatize  a large  number  of enterprises,  the
interministerial  committee  originally  charged  with  providing  strategic
divestiture  guidance  instead  became  involved  in operational  tasks.  .Moreover,
its  lack  of  executive  authority  over  the  ministries  weakened  the  decision-
making  process;  sector  ministries  were  able  to  bypass  the  committee  in
obtaining  approval  for  deals  that  were conducted  in  an ad hoc  manner.
Similarly,  the  exclusion  of the  Ad Hoc Secretariat  from  the  divestiture
dialogue  in the  Congo  led  to legally  contestable  transactions  concluded  by the
"tutelle"  ministry.  In the  Philippines,  poor  coordination  among  the  numerous
implementation  units  on bidding  procedures  led  to  a loss  of credibility  at the
start  of the  program.
43.  The  centralization  of decision-making  in  divestiture  "focal
points"  has  been  seen  by some  governments  as a  way to  rectify  some  of these
problems,  achieve  greater  speed  and  coordination  in implementation,  and
preempt  patronage.  Other  institutionally  specific  factors  have  also  been
considered  in the  setting  up of such  units.  In  Ghana,  for  example,  the
Divestiture  Implementation  Committee  and  its  technical  arm  was  established  as
a focal  point  partly  for  these  reasons,  but  also  as a compromise  between  the
competing  State  Enterprises  Commission  and  the  Ghana  Investment  Center,  both
of  which  wanted  to  manage  the  divestiture  program.  The  Ministry  of State
Enterprises  serves  as the  focal  point  for  all  divestments  in  Togo.  Similar
units  have  also  been  established  in the  Gambia  and  Madagascar.  Countries  with
predominantly  decentralized  arrangements  have  also  set-up  central  bodies.  In
the  Philippines,  for  example,  a central  coordinating  team  has been  established
to set  uniform  maeketing  and  bidding  strategies,  oversee  implementation,  and
centralize  information  (all  of  which  were  problems  under  a purely
decentralized  arrangement).  Similarly,  in  Mexico,  the  PE Sales  Unit in the
Ministry  of Finance  was strengthened  to  counter  balance  the  lack  of
transparency  resulting  from  eecentralization.
44.  Focal points are most effective where: (i) they are srmlall  and
staffed  with  high quality  people  with  a range  of contacts,  clout,  experience,
and  adequate  skills;  (ii)  there  are  safeguards  to ensure  that  members  abide  by
formal  procedures  for  the  divestment  of state  assets;  and (iii)  the
responsibilities  of the  central  unit  vis-a-vis  those  of the  different
ministries  are  clearly  delineated.  In  the  absence  of these  conditions,  they
can  become  characterized  by bureaucratization,  the  lack  of transparency  from
the  concentration  of power,  or the  exclusion  of the  central  unit from  the
divestiture  process.  In  Madagascar,  for  example,  the  Ad Hoc Committee  for
Divestiture  (CAH)  was initially  created  to ensure  openness  and  a competitive
atmosphere  in implementation.  But its  role  has  been reduced  to  a technical
advisory  function  for  only  a few  divestiture  actions.  Moreover,  responsibility
for the  liquidation  aspect  of the  program  was transferred  from  this  body to
yet  another  one.
45.  One issue  transcends  those  related  to the  official
organizational  structures  set  up for  divestiture.  Bank staff  indicate  that  in-19-
several  cases  the  official  institutional  arrangements  have  not  been  effeccive
in  surmounting  the  tendency  to  centralize  all  decision  making  powers  at the
highest  levels,  and  not  to delegate  to  lower  levels.  While  such  decision-
making  patterns  are  beyond  the  Bank  and  are  broader  issues  of overall  public
administration,  Bank  operations  have,  at  best,  tried  to  provide  the  formal
insticutional  structure  for  divestiture.
46.  Adherence  to Formal  and  Legal  Procedures.  A number  of countries
(Ghana,  Philippines,  Togo,  Madagascar,  Venezuela,  Morocco,  and  Tunisia,  for
example)  have  set  divestiture  guidelines  prior  to implementation,  clarifying
the  institutional  arrangements  and  processes  for  managing  the  reform,
establishing  rules  and legal  requirements  for  liquidation  and  the  disposal  of
assets  and/or  shares,  and  enunciating  the  need for  transparency  and
objectivity  in  bidding  procedures.  Early  evidence  indicates,  however,  that
these  procedures  have  been ignored  or  bypassed  in  some  cases.  In the  Congo  and
Benin,  for  example,  PEs  were  closed  without  formal  authorization;  in  Guinea,
the  legal  framework  for  the  sale  of the  assets  of the  liquidated  firms  was
bypassed.
47.  In the  case  of sales,  while  experiences  vary  widely,  concern  has
been  expressed  about  the  ad  hoc  nature  of the  procedures  and  the  lack  of
transparency.  Some  early  sales  in the  Philippines  were  characterized  by
inconsistent  decisions  regarding  the  mir.imum  number  of  bids and  swap
conditions. Divestiture  has  come  to  be viewed  as a  way to enrich  well-
connected  individuals.  Moreover,  in  several  countries,  sales  have  been  made to
dubious  purchasers;  i.e.,  ruling  party  politicians  and  other  "well-connected"
individuals  lacking  in  business  experience  and  technical  expertise  (Panama,
Guinea,  Congo).  In  Madagascar,  the  more  attractive  PEs  were  disposed  of
privately  without  public  tendering. In Panama,  one  PE  was  originally  sold  to
a shell  company  comprised  of a group  of ruling  party  politicians.  The  company
went  bankrupt  and  was repossessed  by the  Agriculture  Development  Bank,  which
subsequently  auctioned  off the  assets  piecemeal.
48.  A certain  measure  of flexibility  may  be required  on  a case-by-
case  basis  to forestall  bureaucratic  delays.  But  the  overall  disregard  for
formal  procedures  and the  resulting  lack  of transparency  raise  serious
concerns  for  both the  Bank  and  divesting  governments.  Despite  the  fact  that
the  Bank  does  not  and  cannot  control  the  divestiture,  the  association  of all
divestiture  actions  with  the  Bank-supported  adjustment  program  can  make the
Bank  an  easy target  for  blame,  leaving  the  institution  with  a  bad name  and
with the  charge  of ideological  bias.  And,  the  chances  of future  success  are
jeopardized.  In response  to these  concerns,  Bank  operations  are  emphasizing
the  need to:  (i)  focus  attention  on the  divestiture  strategy,  rather  than  on
specific  deals;  and (ii)  tighten,  systematize,  and  render  transparent
divestment  procedures.  In the  Congo,  for  example,  the  PE ID project  is
financing  an international  investment  bank  to establish  and  strengthen  the  a
priori  rules  and  procedures  for  asset  disposal.  And  operations  in Benin,
Gabon,  CAR,  and  Mexico  call  for  the  design  of  standardized  procedures  prior  to
implementation.  Simultaneously,  the  enforcement  of the  procedures  is  expected
through  strengthened  institutional  arrangements.-20-
49.  Technical  Assistance.  Divestiture  requires  technical  expertise
of a type  often  not found  in  borrower  governments  or even local  private
sectors  in  some  countries:  accountants,  lawyers,  and financial  analysts,  for
example.  These  skill  shortages,  in  addition  to the  lack  of highly  specialized
skills  such  as investment  banking,  can  lead  to  major  implementation  delays.
Poorly  paid  public  officials  rarely  have  the  expertise  in the  highly  technical
aspects  of some types  of divestiture.  The  slow  staffing  of the  Divestiture
Implementation  Committee  (DIC)  and  its  technical  sub-committee  in  Ghana  was  a
key  factor  delaying  the  attainment  of SAL  II  divestiture  targets,  for  example;
similar  circumstances  apply  in  Senegal  and  elsewhere.  Moreover,  poor  access  to
external  resources  and inadequate  linkage  with the  stock  exchange  leave
important  issues  such  as pricing,  timing,  and  size  of issue  either  sidestepped
or not  fully  understood  by the  implementing  parties.
50.  Thirty  of the  71  operations  finance  TA to  strengthen  the
capacity  of the  managing  institutions  to execute  divestiture  targets  in  a
timely  and  effective  way (Table  4).  T'he  majority  of these  operations  provide
assistance  for  preparatory  activities  (enterprise  audits,  classification
exercises,  and the  development  of action  plans).  Some  twelve  operations
finance  assistance  for  specific  implementation  tasks,  including  legal  matters;
pricing  issues;  negotiating  the  terms  and conditions  of the  sale,  management
contract  or leases;  identification  of  private  partners;  and  regulation  after
sale.  These  operations  are  found  in countries  in  which  the  scope  of reform  is
relatively  large:  the  Congo,  Madagascar,  Gambia,  Ghana,  Togo,  Uganda,  Morocco
and  Venezuela,  for  example.  The  remaining  operations  either  use  unallocated
funds  from  existing  TA,  or provide  no TA at all.  This  could  reflect  a variety
of factors:  the  small  scope  or early  stage  of reform  in  these  countries;  the
availability  of grant  money  or assistance  from  other  donors  (USAID  and  Asian
Development  Bank  in Philippines,  USAID  in  Jamaica,  for  example);  time  and
resource  constraints  in the  preparation  of new  projects;  and  country
resistance  to external  involvement  in this  politically  sensitive  area.
51.  Bank  staff  face  certain  difficulties  in  designing  and
implementing  TA for  divestiture:  (i)  identification  of qualified  yet
affordable  technical  assistance  in this  new lending  area; 26 (ii)  the  time-
pressures  in taking  loans  to the  Board;  and (iii)  the  often  long  lag  between
operations  (in  Senegal,  for  instance,  where  specific  institutional  needs  have
been identified,  but there  is a  potential  lag  between  TAL  II,  which  has  been
extended,  and  the  proposed  Parapublic  III  project,  the  preparation  of  which
has  been delayed  due  to the  lack  of staff  resources.)  The  poor quality  of
technical  assistance  has, in some  cases,  contributed  to implementation  delays
(Senegal  and  Ghana,  for  example).
26  The  cost  vs quality  dilemma  is  often  posed:  specialized  firms  (merchant
and  investment  banks,  for  example)  are  most  qualified  to  undertake  privatization
tasks  but  they  demand  high  fees.  Moreover,  they  may  be  difficult  to  involve  given
weak investment  opportunities  in  many of the  less  developed  countries.  At the
same  time,  their  services  are  perhaps  less  critical,  and  more  easily  replaceable
by  qualified  individual  consultants,  in  smaller  countries  which  are  not  selling
in international  markets.-21-
4.  Financing  Divestiture
52.  A crucial  factor  in  many  countries  is the  relatively  limited
capacity  of the  indigenous  private  sector  and  local  capital  markets  to respond
to  divestiture. Poor  domestic  resource  mobilization,  a  weak tradition  of
local  equity  investment,  low  investor  confideiice,  overvalued  and  unstable
exchange  rates,  and  financially  strapped  banking  systems  have led  to  potential
financing  constraints,  particularly  in  the  case  of the  bigger  privatizations.
This  combination  of factors  has led  to foreign  participation  in  a number  f
countries.  In Guinea,  for  instance,  foreign  partners  obtained  majority
ownership  in  fifteen  industrial  enterprises  including  tobacco,  beer,  and
cement;  and  in Togo,  70%  of the  share  capital  of newly  divested  enterprise.s  is
foreign.  However,  the  restrictions  on  certain  purchasers  (foreign  and  certain
local  groups),  combined  with  limited  local  capacities  can  be a major
bottleneck  to the  implementation  of larger  divestments.
53.  The question  of financing  mechanisms  for  divestiture  has  been
directly  addressed  in  only  a few  Bank  operations.  In  Togo,  technical
assistance  is  provided  to the  Ministry  of Economy  and  Finance  under  the
Enterprise  Development  project  to establish  a  Mutual  Investment  Fund.  As a
financial  intermediary  holding  and  issuing  shares  to individual  and
institutional  investors,  the  Fund  is  expected  to  play  a key  role in
facilitating  the  participation  of  Togolese  investors  in the  privatization
process  and  in  deepening  financial  markets.  In  Morocco,  technical  assistance
is  provided  under  the  PERL  for  advice  on stimulation  of the  stock  market,
introduction  of new  financial  instruments  and  promotion  of  brokerage
institutions.  (Assessment  of the  effectiveness  cf these  experiments  is
lacking.)  And in  Senegal,  an Investment  Fund  is .ieing  set  up to address
financing  issues. The  majority  of operations,  hL.3ever,  pay  minimal  attention
to  developing  innovative  financial  instruments  --  such  as debt/equity  swaps
and the  use  of government  bonds,  strengthening  tht  ability  of  banks  and  other
financial  institutions  to sell  shares  and  subsequently  transfer  them,
utilizing  pension  funds,  tapping  cross-border  investments  and  setting  up
schemes  nationals  residing  abroad,  developing  employee  participation  schemes
and  so  on --  that  are  particularly  critical  as the  larger  and  more  complex
divestments  come  to the  implementation  stage.  The  Cofinanding  and  Financial
Services  Department  (DFS)  has  begun  work  on this  topic  and  is  proposing  to
accelerate  its  work  program  on the  use  of debt/equity  swaps  in  privatization.
5.  Divestiture  and  Labor
54.  The  resistance  of labor  to  divestiture  is  often  posed  by
governments  as a serious  obstacle  to  divestiture.  Of course,  labor  concerns
are  not  just  a divestiture  issue.  They  are  also  related  to  the  broader
adjustment  measures  of  public  sector  rationalization  and  public  expenditure-22-
reform.  Indeed,  these  latter  measures  may generate  greater  labor  opposition
than  that  directly  attributable  to divestiture.  Nevertheless,  labor  opposition
can indeed  slow the  pace  of the  divestiture  program,  particularly  in  countries
where  past  employment  and  pay  policies  have  granted  job  security  and
relatively  high  wages  to large  and  excess  numbers  of employees  and  where  there
is  an absence  of alternative  employment  opportunities  elsewhere  in the
economy.  Other  countries  have,  however,  found  ways  to mitigate  labor
opposition.  In the  Philippines,  for  instance,  where  overstaffing  has  been less
of a problem,  80%  of the  workers  were rehired  by the  divested  companies.
Generous  severance  packages  were  provided  to the  laid-off  staff.  Similar
experiences  have  been recorded  in Panama  and  Malaysia. 27 In  Mexico,
employment  concerns  were ameliorated  by the  early  involvement  of  workers
unions,  who  became  partners  in eleven  of the  newly  divested  companies.  Other
countries  such  as Bangladesh  and  Malaysia  have  minimized  the  potential
negative  impact  of restructuring  by reserving  shares  for  disadvantaged  groups.
55.  The  employment  ramifications  of liquidations,  in  particular,
have  been  high.  In Benin,  for  instance,  3,000  employees  of liquidated  PEs
became  unemployed;  in  Mali,  700  employees  have  so far  been terminated;  and in
Tunisia,  the  liquidations  to  date  have involved  1,600  lay-offs.  Training  and
Redeployment  funds  have  been  established  to softet.  the  social  impact  of
adjustment  (includ'ng  divestiture)  in  several  operations.  For  example,  a
reinsertion  fund  has  been  established  under  Senegal  SAL  III  to ease  the
transition  of laid-off  workers  and to  provide  resources  for  small-scale
projects  in  agriculture,  industry,  fisheries,  commerce  and services.  Similar
programs  are  employed  in  Mali,  in  Ghana  --  where,  in  addition,  divested  state-
oined  land  is  allocated  to  retrenched  workers  --  and  Benin.  Togo SAL  III
finances  studies  of staff  reconversion  and  retraining  programs  and  alternative
sources  of income  and  employment  such  as employee/management  repurchase  of
enterprises  through  leverage  buyouts,  and/or  lines  of credit  to  assist  in the
start-up  of small  businesses.
56.  While  it is still  too  early  to assess  how these  have  worked
(indeed,  any  assessment  goes  beyond  the  narrow  issue  of divestiture),  scanty
evidence  indicates  that  such funds,  while  they  may  help  alleviate  the  short-
term  adjustment  problems  by providing  severance  pay  and  retraining,  are  likely
to  achieve  little  if the  overall  macroeconomic  situation  is  poor,  if  the local
private  sector  is  small  and  lacking  in  dynamism,  and  unemployment  rates  are
27  In the  privatization  of  the  Port  Authority  in  Malaysia,  for  example,  the
workers were given three choices: (i) they could opt  to terminate  their
employment  and receive severance  pay; (ii) they could opt to join the new
company,  but  remain  as employees  of the  Port  Authority;  (iii)  they  could  opt  to
terminate  their  employment  with the  Port  Authority  and  become  employees  of the
new company,  on terms  no less  favorable  than  those  currently  enjoyed.  Ninety-
nine  percent  of the  workforce  opted  to  join the  new  company,  reducing  the  Port
Authority's  payroll  by almost  900  workers.  At the  same time,  the new company
gained concessions:  lifecime job  security was  no  longer guaranteed,  and
compensation  and  promotions  would  be linked  to  work  performance.  See  Roger  Leeds,
Malaysia:  Genesis  of a Privatization  Transaction,  Harvard  University,  December
1988.*23-
already  high.  Thus,  measures  to  address  the  social  costs  should  also focus  on
the  creation  of jobs in the  overall  economy  and  on the  identification  of
substitute  jobs in  other  sectors  (which  may,  obviously,  be a rather  long-term
matter).  The  situation  is not  hopeless.  In the  Gambia,  for  example,
participation  by public  employees  in  the  redeployment  program  was low,
reflecting  good  absorption  rates  by the  private  sector  due to  buoyant  economic
growth.  And in  Guinea  and  Niger,  employees  of liquidated  banks  were  rapidly
redeployed  in  the  private  or public  sector  where  specialized  skills  such  as
accounting  were in  short  supply.  Nevertheless,  in  view  of the  importance  of
these  issues,  more  research  is  required  on developing  adequate  incentive
packages  for  lay-offs  specifically  through  divestiture  and  tracking  of the
laid-off  employees.
C.  SELECTED MANAGEMENT  ISSUES  FOR  THE  BANK
1.  The  Lending  Instrument:  Timing  and  Sequencing
57.  The  process  of divestiture  has  been  more  time-consuming  and
institutionally  intensive  than  originally  anticipated.  The  political  economy
of such  reform,  combined  with the  technical  complexity  of design  and
implementation,  imply  that  overall  PE sector  rationalization  is  a relatively
long-term  process  and  one  that  requires  support  over  a mix  of operations  that
simultaneously  provide  the  needed  policy  and institutional  support.  To date,
quick-disbursing  SALs  have  been  commonly  utilized  as vehicles  for  such  reform.
Indeed,'  SALs  play  a critical  and  necessary  role,  providing  the  needed  leverage
and  encompassing  macroeconomic  policy  reforms  without  which  the  supply
response  to And  expected  benefits  of  divestiture  may  be minimal.  Sales  and
management  contracts,  for  example,  would  have little  efficiency  impact  under
distorted  pricing  and trade  policies,  and  foreign  exchange  allocation  systems.
In short,  liberalization,  simplification  of the  regulatory  framework,  and
increased  commercialization  of the  PE sector  as  a whole  --  all typical
elements  of a SAL  package  --  are  critical  to  creating  the  appropriate
environment  for  the  efficient  operation  of the  divested  companies.  At the  same
time,  SALs  are  not  sufficient  for  divestiture  reform  in  view  of the  commonly
acknowledged  problems  of the:  mismatch  of time-horizons  and their  fast-
disbursing  nature;  inability  to  provide  longer-term  institutional  support  for
implementation;  high  political  visibility;  and  focus  on quantitative  targets.
In short,  SAL  emphasis  on speed  and  quantity  can  lead  to  undesirable  negative
results.  While  these  shortcomings  have  been  overcome  by stretching  out  reform
over  successive  SALs  and  utilizing  TALs  to provide  the  needed  institutional
support,  the  greater  use  of loans  focussed  on the  PE sector  --  including  PE
SECALs  and  PERLs  --  and  the  development  of  more innovative,  slow-disbursing
facilities  would  be critical  to  providing  more in-depth  support  for
divestiture.
58.  The  question  of sequencing  divestiture  with  other  reforms  is
also important,  particularly  in the  case  of  monopolies  and  in  countries  where
the  conditions  for  divestiture  are lacking.  Poor  macro  or industrial-24-
strategies,  inadequately  developed  capital  markets,  and  the  preponderance  of
poorly  performing  PEs  have increased  the  risks  of implementation  failure  and
led  to  potentially  negative  economic  consequences.  Given  these  factors.
divestiture  constraints  have  been (or  could  be)  particularly  difficult  in sub-
Saharan  African  countries,  although,  ironically,  it is these  countries  in
which  the  Bank  has  most  frequently  proposed  such  reform.  Reform  measures  to
commercialize  PE operations  --  including  promoting  financial  discipline,
reforming  labor  laws,  ptoviding  more  autonomy  in pricing  and other  operational
decisions --  can, in these  countries,  play  a critical  role  in screening  the
most  viable  candidates  for  future  divestment  and  putting  the  most inefficient
ones  out  of business,  even  without  the  politically  painful  medicine  of
divestiture.  In  Togo,  for  instance,  broad  policy  limits  on government
expenditures  and  other  financial  discipline  measures  had the  effects  of
employment  reductions  and  PE closures,  both  of  which  facilitated  the
implementation  of the  divestiture  program.
2.  Design  of Divestiture  Conditionality
59.  Approximately  42 of the  71  operationd  specify  the  divestment  of
PEs  as a condition  for  the  release  of funds  (Table  5).  Is such  conditionality
appropriate  and  what  have the  outcomes  been? 28  Different  strategies  have
yielded  different  results.  Divestment  actions  fall  on a  continuum  ranging  from
"hard"  to "soft,"  varying  in the  type  of actions  to  be taken  and their  levels
of stscificity.  At the  "hard"  end,  approximately  ten  operations  require(d)
the  divestment  of specific  PEs  to  be completed  in  time  for  tranche
disbursement  (Guinea,  Togo,  Congo,  and  Panama,  for  example).  While  the  use  of
conditionality  for  the  completion  of liquidations  can  be relatively  less
problematic,  setting  hard targets  for  sales  and  management  contracts  has
proved  to  be counterproductive  for  several  reasons:  (i)  unrealistic  or
specified  deadlines  could  give  investors  unfair  advantages  in  bargaining  on
both the  sale  price  and  special  concessions;  (ii)  complex  transactions,
requiring  the  settlement  of a range  of sensitive  issues,  could  be hastily
concluded  over the  short  tranche  periods;  and (iii)  factors  beyond  the  control
of government  can  delay  completion  and  jeopardize  overall  SAL  success.
Conversely,  the  pressure  to  make  the  numbers  look  good  can lead  to "quick  and
dirty"  deals.
28 The  broader  issue  of the  compliance  with  conditionality  is  r.ot  addressed
here.  Most  countries  tend  to  meet  the  quantitative  targets  set  out  in  the  reform
program.  Few if any loans  are canceled  for  non-compliance;  and only  a handful
of cases  postpone  seriously  tranche  release.  Practically  all supervision  and
tranche  release  reports  use phrases  such as "substantial  progress  achieved,"
'subsequent  projects  expected  to accelerate  the  program,"  "in  accordance  with
intent  of conditions,"  and "conditions  have  been  satisfactorily  met."  In  cases
of  difficulty,  unmet  conditionality  is  simply  rolled  over  into  action  plans  under
subsequent  SALs.-25-
60.  Consequently,  some  loans  adopt(ed)  broader  quantitative  targets,
requiring  governments  to divest  a certain  amount  of PE assets,  with the  choice
of specific  PEs  left  to the  government.  In  Jamaica,  for  instance,  the
conditionality  required  the  divestment  of 'at  least  J$150  million"  of total  PE
assets;  in the  Philippines,  second  tranche  conditionality  called  for  the
completion  of all  steps  to get  30  PEs  in  a "vendible  form",  representing  at
least  20%  of the  gross  value  of assets  to  be privatized.  Such  targets  are,
howiever,  relevant  only in  cases  where  there  are  a relatively  large  number  of
PEs  for  divestment  (as  was the  case  in  both  Jamaica  and the  Philippines).
Where  there  are  but a few  PEs  for  divestment,  quantitative  targets  can  be
tantamount  to  specifying  the  divestment  of individual  PEs.
61.  For  these  reasons,  recent  Bank  loans  appear  to  be moving  toward
"softer"  targets  focussing  on the  initiation  and  completion  of the  procedural
steps  required  prior  to actual  divestment.  Such  conditionality,  it is  argued,
focusses  on the  "best  efforts"  of the  government  in  moving  toward  sector
rationalization,  rather  than  on the  achievement  of  specific  targets  that  are
difficult  to  define  and  supervise.  Thus,  some  twenty  operations  require  the
"initiation"  of divestment  procedures,  specifying,  for  example,  that:
enterprises  be "brought  to the  point  of sale"  and/or  offered  for  sale;  the
search  for  potential  investors  be established;  and  the  institutior.al  set-up
for  implementation  be put in  working  order.  Experience  with  this  approach  has
yet to  be determined.  While  it  resolves  the  difficulties  associated  with
"hard"  targets,  the  trade-off  is  that  it  may  result  in  all  but the  final  --
and  most  meaningful  --  action.  For  irstance,  a condition  of SAL  III  in  Senegal
was that  enterprises  be offered  for  sale.  While  this  was  done,  none  of the
enterprises  have  yet  been sold  (although  it is  not  clear  that  the  sales  would
have occurred  had the  conditionality  been  harder)."9
3.  Monitoring  and  Evaluation
62.  Support  for  divestiture,  particularly  where  the  scope  of reform
is large,  can  entail  a significant  monitoring  and  evaluation  burden  on Bank
staff,  so  much  so that  it is ineffectively  done.  In  Togo,  for  example,  the
initial  leasing  arrangements  of the  steel  mill  were  not  carefully  examined  by
the  Bank,  although  today  much  concern  is  voiced  about  the  long-run  costs  of
this  arrangement  to the  country. 30 In  the  case  of Guinea,  one  Bank  staff
member  indicated  that  infrequent  and  superficial  supervisior  led  to  the  Bank
being  "taken  by surprise"  at the  generous  terms  and  conditions  granted  in the
divestments.  Supervision  difficulties  arise  from  the:  (i)  reluctance  of
goverDnments  to involve  the  Bank  staff  before  specific  transactions  are
completed;  (ii)  tight  staff  resources  vis-a-vis  the  time  required  to follow-up
2  The  difficulties  of  designing  divestiture  conditionality  are  also  covered
in  John Nellis,  Public  Enterprise  Reform  in  Adiustment  Lending,  PPR,  WPS 233,
August  1989.
30  See  Togo,  SAL I, Program  Performance  Audit  Report,  Report  No. SecM88-
876,  July  22,  1988.-26-
on individual  transactions;  (iii)  lack  of expertise  to  assess  spec"ic
transactions (industry specialists, experts in regulatory economics, e'-c.):
and (iv)  complexity  and/or  the  relative  positi,in  of the  component  in 1the
overall  adjustment  program,  leading  to  prioritization  in  supervision  missions.
63.  With  growing  operational  experience  and the  maturing  of Bank
projects,  supervision  reports  are  covering  the  divestiture  component  in
greater  amount  of detail.  Valuable  information  is  provided  not  only  on the
numbers  of enterprises  divested  but  also  on the  type  and  value  of assets  being
divested,  the  amount  of revenues  raised  throuvh  sales,  the  extent  of foreizn
participation,  and the  institutional  procedures  in implementing  reform.  In  the
Philippines,  a regularized  monitoring  system  has  been  established  under  the
PERL  so as to  ease  the  supervisory  burden  at the  Barnk's  end.  The importanice  of
adequate  monitoring  and  ex  Dost  evaluation  cannot  be overemphasized,
particularly  in  the  case  of the  larger  programs  yielding  potentially  big
efficiency  gains.  Togo  SAL  III,  for  example,  supports  a reassessment  studv  of
the  divestiture  program  to  date.  Similar  studies  and  reviews  are  also
supported  in  Niger,  CAR,  and  Mexico.
IV.  CONCLUSIONS
64.  The  above  analysis  demonstrates  the  following  conclusions
regarding  the  use, in  Bank  operations,  of divestiture  as a tool  of PE reform.
Sinc.,  Bank  support  for  divestiture  may  be construed  as,involvement  in the
internal  politics  of borrower  countries,  and  since  the  political  and  economic
conditions  vary from  country  to  country,  a fundamental  conclusion  of this
study  is that  the  Bank  cannot  use a single  design  and  implementation  blteprint
for  all  countries.  Bank  operations  should  be flexible,  paying  careful
attention  in strategy  formulation  to  prevailing  country  conditions.
65.  In addition  to the  need  for  country  specificity,  other
conclusions  and  suggestions  for  improving  the  design,  implementation,  and
management  of  Bank  operations  supporting  divestiture  are  offered.  First,  while
there  have  been  a relatively  large  number  of divestments  in  several  cases,  the
divestiture  actions  have  not  have  yielded  the  full  potential  of the  expected
fiscal  and  efficiency  gains.  In some  cases,  they  may, in fact,  have led  to
negative  consequences.  Several  factors  account  for  these  results:  (i)  the
divestment  of predominantly  small-  and  medium-sized  enterprises  that  are
neither  the  biggest  portion  of the  financial  burden  on the  government  nor  a
likely  source  of significant  sales  revenue;  (ii)  the  use  of partial
divestments  of commercial  PEs  operating  in  competitive  markets  for  strategic
and  other  reasons  that  could  lead  to  continued  government  interference  and  few
improvements  in  operational  efficiency;  (iii)  the  assumption  by governments  of
liabilities  that  are  often  higher  than  the  sale  price;  (iv)  the  granting  of
special  privileges  and  monopoly  rights  to  attract  new investors,  which  create
new  sources  of inefficiency.-27-
66.  The lack of significant outcomes can be traced in part to the
policical constraints facing member-  governments. In part, they can be traced
to weaknesses in design and implementation  of the reform program. Improvements
in the divestiture process would therefore seem desirable, with greater Bank
iii,ol'cinent  in specifying clearly the criteria or principles for the: (i)
.;d~Li  .n  and targeting of candidates and techniques, taking into account
-ount:;  conditions (use of management contracts and Joint ventures where-
m:  -i&'.sale  is difficult, for example); (ii)  preparation of PEs for sale,
.:  ,i  t  _iancial  restructuring, shedding of excess labor, and managerial
.ipr-o~eifeiIs;  (iii) development of appropriate  methodologies for asset
-altidcion;  (iv) resolution  of outstanding liabilities of the PEs to be
di-'ested,  particularly the larger ones; (v) deal-making process, including
co;mpetitive  bidding, avoidance of special privileges and concessions, etc; and
(vi)  liquidations of enterprises  where sales have proved difficult.
67.  Second, the bulk of Bank involvement to date has taken place in
sub-Saharan Africa. Clearly, the scope for the divestiture of the small- and
medium-sized commercial enterprises exists in these countries. But the
combinacion of distorted macro environments,  weak local private sectors, and
inadequate institutional  capacities demonstrate that Bank operations pay
particular attention to the sequencing of divestiture with other macro and PE
sector reforms in this region.  Thus, the divestiture of some PEs, especially
those of  large PEs being divested into monopolistic or nearly monopolistic
markets, is best coordinated with the removal of existing distortions and the
creacion of the necessary regulatory and institutional  framework. Moreover,
strict fina-icial  discipline and commercial  policies would also result in the
closture  of inefficient PEs without having to go through the politically
painful steps of outright liquidations. In short, the  best policy in some
cases may be to create the appropriate environment for the efficient
functioning of PEs, and avoid an overemphasis  on divestiture ver se. Ownership
changes are only one element of the overall reform program, the implementation
of which could foster the appropriate climate for divestiture at a more
opportlne moment. And the threat of divestiture could itself serve to increase
PE  efficiency.
58.  Third, inadequately specified organizational  arrangements and
the lack of technical expertise have resulted, in some cases, in significant
institutional  problems in the implementation  of divestiture. This has led to
many problems, including the lack of transparency  and the lack of adherence to
formal procedures. Where the scope of the program has been large and where
local capacities are limited, the problems have been especially severe.
Greater care could be taken in Bank operations to delineate, a priori, the
institutional set-up for executing divestiture in a timely and transparent
fashion. While these are bound to be highly country-specific, experience
demonstrates some important guiding principles: avoidance of excessive
bureaucratization by minimizing the number of institutions involved; ensuring
quick access to top decision-making levels; making easily available the
necessary technical expertise; and establishing, ex ante, clear guidelines for
the deal-making process.
69.  Fourth, as countries progress to larger and more complex
divestitures, there  would be a need for Bank operations to: (i) provide more-28-
implementation  assistance  for  asset  valuation,  selection  of technique,
establishment  of the  regulatory  framework,  and  the  like;  (ii)  arrange
financial  resources  to  meet  the  transaction  costs,  including  employee
liabilities  and the  settlement  of liabilities;  (iii)  address  the  labor  issues
more  directly,  devising  attractive  severance  packages  and  other  mechanisms  to
mitigate  potential  opposition;  and (iv)  develop  financing  mechanisms,  such  as
debt/equity  swaps,  use  of government  bonds,  and  mutual  investment  funds,  to
facilitate  the  implementation  of large  divestitures.in  countries  with
relatively  weak  private  sectors.  These  demands  would  require  greater  use  of
lending  instruments  other  than  quick-disbursing  SALs.  These  could  include
public  enterprise  loans,  private  sector  development  loans,  as  well  as
conventional  projects.  In  addition,  new  slow-disbursing  facilities
specifically  geared  to  meeting  the  needs  of divestiture  may  also  need to  be
created.
70.  Fifth,  the  preparation  and supervision  of  divestiture  reform  can
be staff  intensive  in terms  of time  and  expertise  where  the  program  is large.
Operational  staff,  who are  often  overstretched  with  responsibilities  spanning
two  to three  countries,  emphasize  the  difficulties  in identifying  and
obtaining  the  needed  technical  resources  from  other  parts  of the  Bank  and IFC
for  preparation,  appraisal,  and  supervision.  The.poor  fit  between  an
institutionally  intensive  reform  program  and  shortages  of appropriate  staff
resources  clearly  needs  to  be addressed  at the  management  level.  Moreover,  the
monitoring  and  evaluation  of divestiture  actions  --  the  need for  which  is
unquestionable  -- is  also  likely  to  place  further  strains  on staff  resources.
71.  Finallv,  future  research  efforts  should  focus  on conducting  more
in-depth  case  studies  to: (i)  gather  more  factual  data  on the  numbers  and
types  of enterprises  being  divested,  the  magnitude  of divestment  in  terms  of
the  overall  sector,  the  techniques  utilized,  etc; (ii)  analyze  the  process  of
such  reform,  who  is doing  what,  how  are  decisions  made,  etc.;  and (iii)
analyze  the  several  unanswered  questions  with  regard  to the  financial,
economic  and  distributional  outcomes  of divestiture  reform.-29-
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Guinea  2  3
Guinea  lissau  2  2
Madagascar  2  1  3
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Mlai  2  2
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Sudan  1  1
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MUK  PROJICTS  WITH  OIVtSTITURE C  OENTS
(Appoved  as  of  June  1989)
Board  Loin
Region  Coufty  Oporoeion  ApWovOt  AiwUit
.................................................................................
AFRICA  8min  PC Rehial.  86/12  15.0
SAL  89/05  45.0
luru.df  SAL I  86/05  15.0
SAL 11  U/06  90.0
Caroon  SAL  89/06  150.0
CAR  Eco'.  Maneg4nt  U/12  13.2
SAL 1  86/09  14.0
SAL 11  88/06'  40.0
Congo  PE 10  87/07  15.2
SAL  CT07r  70.0
Casbtn  SAL  86/04  50.0
GCaata  Enterprise  Ov.  U/12  10.0
SAL  86/08  5.0
SAL It  89/06  23.0
Ghun  Ind.  SECAL  86/03  28.5
PEL  87/10  10.5
SAL  87/04  3  .0
SAL It  89/04  120.0
Guinea  SAL I  86/02  25.0
SAL It  68/06  6S.0
tAL  I  85/03  9.5
Guine  s  issau  SAL  87/05  10.0
SAL It  89/05  23.4
Madagascar  Econ.  Management  $8/12  22.0
Ind. rd  Trade  87/06  67.0
PS  Adj.  8W06  125.0
Netaoi  SAL III  S5/12  30.0
Mati  of  10  U8/06  9.5
FE  SECAL  8U/06  40.0
Mauritania  Pt TAL  85/03  16.4
Niger  PE tO  87/07  5 5
PE  SECAL  87/06  60.0
SAL  86/02  20.0
Sao  Yw  t  Prim.  SAL  87/06  4.0
Sngat  SAL 11  86/02  20.0
SAL III  87/05  45.0
TAL II  83/07  11.0
Suan  TAL  87/05  9.0
togo  Pvt.  Ent.  87/09  11.5
SAL 1  83/05  40.0
SAL II  85/OS  27.8
SAL III  8t/03  45.0
TAL 11  82/06  3.5
TAL  III  8S/OS  6.2
Ugda  PE Project  88/11  15.0
Icon.  Recovery  J/09  65.0
Zaire  SAL  87/06  55.0
tAL  87/06  12.0-32-
rTato 2
SAN Pn  OJICTS  WITH  0dESTITURE  C.PCWfNTS
(APeOw  as of  JUm 1969)
loard  Loan
R"irn  CountryV  Oprtion  Appsrvol  Amouit
.................................................................................
LAC  Chilo  SAL II  86i/l  250.0
.....  TAL  e5/03  11.0
Costs RIca  SUL  85/06  80.0
Nwvokra  SAL  86/09  50.0
Jamica  Pe SECAL  87/06  20.0
SAL  1  82/03  76.2
SAL 11  83/06  60.2
SAL III  84/11  55.0
TAL  It  8S/03  9.0
mexice  Pe tofor.  89/06  500.0
P1|  SAL I  83/11  60.2
SAL 11  86/12  100.0
TAL  83/11  5.0
Uruguay  SL  I  87/06  80.0
SAL ll  89/06  140.0
Venzuela  SAL  89/06  402.0
ENNHA  Morocco  PIL  87/05  240.0
......... Tuism~ia  PUL  89/06  130.0
Turkey  SAL  V  .86/06  376.0
ASIA  epet  SAL  87/03  50.0
........  . ..  - Inden  ia  PSO  89/05  350.0
Ptilipsines  Econ.  Recovery  87/03  300.0
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Gamia  loit.Dey.  K  K  K
SAL II 
I.........  ....  ... I.......  .
Ghm  IAL  I  ..  I  ....  I
KL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
madag  ~ScALoN  . III  II  . I.x 
GineaS  ALI  IIxx 
.[.IAI  IILi  I  IIi
SAL  I.Ii  .
Malwi.AtII  *11  II  xIII  1111... -- - - -- - - - --1  - -- - - - -- - - -- - - - -- - - - ..  . ..  . . .- - - - - I  .--  - - -II  .--  - - -I-- - -- - I.---  - - -- - -- - IGJAIK  SUPPOt~t  flO  DIVEST  IWBE
Loan  Studies  Classif.  Action  jieneral Ssrengtheningj  Create  A"~  Liquida.]  Privat.  j
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liming  for  PEf  progress  PEG  PEs  Pts  ffs ....  . .......  ......  ........  ... ...  ..........  ...  .............  ...  1......  ------
A.  INhIICtUR  E ACTIONS
........  ........ x.auu
Action  Sanin  I  9urundi  I  lenin  I  lenin  I  I
Already  tcengo  Rurudi  11  Costa  Rica
TakenV  (i  PS  Pna  1
Effec.  Niger  Pt  Senegal  11
Cotdition  logo I  Costa  Nice
Zaire
Costa  Rica
..........  --  --  - --  - --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  - . -- . - --  --  ......  ...  ..  .........  ,_._.  _____.__.._
Iranch  Cawoon  Benin  I  Ghan  I  CAR I  heno  I  Icongo
Condition  logo  11  Cengo  Guinea  I  Cono  Senegal  III  Guinee  It
Philip.  E-  Chm  11  logo  I  aIll  logo i1  Chile  Is
Guinea-Bissau  Niger  Pf  Pane  I  I  Jam_ice  III
Nadagascar PS  Senegal  III  Venezuela  Jmica  PE
Ntli  PE  1090  I I  PPhilip.  Etc  Panama  II
Chile  11  Ja_mice  Pf  IPhilip.  GC  lunisia
Jamaica PE  Jan_ica  I  Tunisia
Mexico  PE
Urutuay  II
............  ..........................  ....  -----------------......----------.-.-.-..-----...---.-...---.-
D.  NN-NOITORASLE  ACTIONS  I
Congo  I  lunisia  CAR I  Niger  SAl
Guinea  I  |  CANR  11  |Niger  PE  I
Madagascar PS  CARt  Econ.l4t.  Jamica  I
Niger  I  |  |Congo I  |J  ica  PE
logo  I  |  PCGbon  aPnama  I
leo090  11  l Guines  I  IPenWn :I
Jaica  I  mamdgascar  PS  tunisia ~~Jama ~~~~Senegal  I I
I  Ilogo  1  klogo
I  I  I  1  110~~~~~~~~~~loo  11  11
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DtVESTItUxI  UTCWIS
Loan Effective  or
Loan/eOport  Tranche Targets  Status  Cmnts
enin  SAL: Setfsfuctory  progress  Action  prior  to  Lotw:  Proceed insufficient  to  pay
in  implenting  PC sector  Oissolution/tIq.  of  12 Pfs  (TAB,  *m,loyee  clsimo
(Staff  Appraisat  restructuring  plan.  TRAIS1E111il,  ISETEX, SOMIAS,  Cil,
Report  for  SAL,  SOTRACO0,  SOSATItAC,  SOGiCOI,  etc.)
5 891
Privati2stion  of 6  PUs (WHAA,
OhECI,  OMAYT  W,  AGU, RAVINAx)
CAP  SAL t:  Liq.  Report  & Privatizatlan  report  Liquidation  Report  not
Preparstion  of  pta./liq.  prepared  satisfactory:  new reort
tGack-to*Office  report  for 196J.  being  prepred
Report  4-891  10  Pts  in  process of  liq.(3  baks,
Reduce liq.  oxpenss  and  transportation,  tourim,  pLbtic
coletet  liqs.  by ODc.  1969  works,  bookstore)
Pursue  ptz.  of  8 PEs  3  PEs in  process  of  ptm.(wood  pro'
cessing,  staughterhouse,  loether)
Econ Mgt:
Coetot  negotiations  on  6  PEs ptzd.  (shipping,  food  pro-
SEGA,  SIIRI  cessing,  pu"Lic  works,  insurace,
mechanica. and bookstore)
Pursue neotiiations  on 6
other  PCs
Audits  just  beginwinm;  will  not
StU*  ptta  of  other  PUs  met  2nd Tranche  reteaso  date
con"o  1nols,aantation  of  Pt  divest  Futl  privatization  of 3  PUs  (UAI,
progri  as agred  SIAP,  SOCOEU)
(Supervision
Report  1  Progress  in  iapln  tation  Opening of  caoital  for  1t  PEs
of  settlement  of  de;ts  of  (textite,  nedustry,  agriculture,
Pes to  be  liq/ptz/rehab.  food  processing,  etc.)
Liquidation  of  10 PUs (hotels,
yogurt,  ship  bui  lding,  etc.)
Gabon  Decisions  on PEs for Liq.  Decisions  maHd  conerning  ptz/tiq  Govt.  will  neod reinforcent
and/or  privatization  of  Gabon-1nformtique,  SlI,  SHN,  of  team in  chargo  of  parastatal
cSelt-to.Offic  SQTEGA(textiles),  SNTH(hotel)  reform  (only  3  persons  currently
Report 4-89;  invotved)
lack-to-Office  Decisios  made  as to  reform  of  6
Report  5-891  PEsCOPRAG,  SONATRAN.  CItl,  ASECNA,
Ciments  du  Gabon,  31CR)
Govt.  is  to  reduce  sharaholding  of
SNGt (wood marketing)
Action  prior  to  loan:
6 liq.  in  19-678J:  P1it  (gas  dist.),
Sotravit  (urban  petro.  explor.),
CODEV nd  SOGACCO  (cm.  distr.),
Petrogab  (petro.  explor.),  and
SoNADECI  (agri.)
v.con t.
Lown Effective  or
Loan/leport  Trancho  Targets  Statue  Conts
GaCBi  Ent.  0ev.  Preopard  valuations  for  soveral
PE progorss  review  and  implem.  holdings.
plan  for  div.  progrm.
Minoeity  holdins  of  itsndrd
SAL It:  Chartered  t  ik  CPAO  (trading  co.)
satisfactory  performnce  wd  trikan  Ice  offered  for  public
review,  ir.  assessaent  of  sale.
progrnss  in  impt.m of  Pf
divestiture  progrm.  Stoep  initiated  for  div.  of  minor-
ity  holdings  of  Seagull  Coldatores
ad  African  (Sunwing)  Motel
Moldings  for  Standard  Chartered
lank,  CFAO  aid Old Atlantic  Motet
sold.
Ghwna  SAL 1:  32  SMs  advertized  foe  sale:  Delays way  undermine  credibility
S PEs will  be offered  for  of SEC  and overall  divestiture
sate/liq.  10 have dosioers  prepared  progrom IFC  is  recmaiwnided
for  ptz.  for  assistance  in  identifying
Proceedings  for  aother 5 Pfs  private  partners.
Will  be initiated.  6  have  Govt.  c_initmnnt  to
sell  its  interest  in  joint  Delays  in  divestiture  prn  grm
Divestiture  Committee  created.  venture  duo  to Lack  of adequate  and
quolified  staff:  untikely  that
PeL:  tO  PEs  are at  final  stage of  tiq.  1989 targets  can  be  met.
Coeleote  dossiers  for  5  Pas.
Initioto  div.  on 10  PEs.
SECAL:
login  div.  of solected
incustrial  SOEs
SAL It:
ntpl.  of  1989 div.  progrm.
Agreement  on  1990 div.  progrim




Loon  Effective  or
LOarv/Qemrt  trancho  TargetS  Status  ComWm  ts
Guinea  SAL I:  Privatized  PEs:  29  industriol.  2  PIE  on  list  which  are  not  Ptzd.
Govt.  wiLt  have  Degui  inptm_  ce_ rical,  1  service  by and  of 1989  witt  be  LiQ.
of tiq.  progrm for  primary
banks.  Liquidated  PEC: 10  industriet,  51  Oetrospectiv*  review  of  ptz/Liq.
cennreial,  8 service.  program  to be  un ertaken  with
Govt.  mitt  establish  AP for  Bank  fin  ancing.
restruc.  of non-industriel  pgs to  be pt2/Liq:  S industrist,
PEs,  including  divestiture.  7  comerciolt  2  service.
SAL It:
Agreement  with  Govt.  on  List
of  Pes  for  divest..  including
timotable  for  imple~ntation.
madagascar  PC SICAL:  Liquidation  begun:  9 PUs  NecessaryE  docuntation concern-
Seth.  progress  in  iiplem.  divestiture  actions  not  received
ESupervision  of  AP for  20  PEs  inct.  div.  Liquidated:  18  PEs  or ince  rlete  falls  short  of
Menu 7-891  tranche  reLease  eonditionalities
3rd  tranche  release  requires  Disego"agment  started:  9  PEs
20  ture  PE action  plane.  Legal  diff.  stiLl  exist  reit'vig
2isengagement  complete:  7  Pfs  to  ability  to  ompiete  liq.
Ind  &  Trade:  Preparation  of  actions;  likety  to  worsen.
AP  for  PCs.
M-Li  Complete  liq.  of t0 Listed  15 PUs atready  dissolved,  awaiting  GoverrMent  intengs  to  retain
Pfs (2nd  tranhe).  Iiq.  proceedings  (Air  MALI,  S10,  majority  ownership  on only  6  out
SAT, SCAUE, SEUIMA. SOCOIA.  LP",  35 PEs in  div.  program
Liq.  remaining  5  PEs (3rd  SOCOqAM,  SGSEPEC, SOpIIX.  SONIA,
trnche)).  SONETNA,  OCtMAM,  CH,  IEMA).
Studv  of 22 remaiing PEs  Liq.  proceedings  wL  advanced  for
to  estabLish  APs.  a  numer of  companies  (Air  MaLi).
Majority  control  transfered  to
private  sector  on 2  Pis  (ITEMA,
SEPCH)
Niger  PE SECAL:  13  PIs  privatized  ovt.  agreed  to  compLete  iiplem
Complete  tiq.  of UMCC  And  o  greed div  program
SONIFPAI  2  Pfs intograted  w/Govt.  a9encies
I  PE Liquidated
Senrgal  SAL It:  List  of PES  for  ptz/liq.  adopted  SAL IV  Initisting  Weo:  Lists
Progre  s  in  implPa.  of  div.  March 1986 (SAL  II).  preporation  of  list  on PES  to  be
[Project  Complo  plan  of  Pie  studied  in  SAL I  privatiz*  d  (and  prep  ration  for
tion eport  6$89;  (9  P6s).  List  of 10  additional  Pis for  sale  ot 1st  group  freo  th  s
SAL :V  Initiating  pt2.  presented  (no  s1Les  as  of  list)  as  condition  for  nard
Memo  2-891  Agreement  on schedUle  for  June  1989)  presentation.
div.  10  more  Pig.
Liquidation  of  6  PES  & 2  public
SAL III:  establi  sments ceopleted  April
Offer  sale  of 6 PUs.  1988.
Portial  sale  of  4  PEs.
Identify  10  more  Pts  for  pt2.
eCilete  liquidation  of  7
PEs,  2  pubLic  establishments.-42-
OtWISTI?WI  aJ?CMS
con#  t.
Loan  Effective  or
Loan/Report  Trencho  Targets  StrtuA  Cim~ents
Togo  SAL It:  10  privetizations:  ShS,  StM.  Consultant  responsiblt  for
Substantiat  ad satisf.  pro-  SOPROLAIT,  IOTO,  Nuileries  rogo-  view fett  ilL;  doecision  nat
gress  in  imples.  div.  plans  Iises,  SCOITO,  SOPIOW^,  SOTCOh,  reploace  him,  ut  to  await 
for  Pis  studios  wnder  SAL t.  ItP,  Sucrerie  d'Anio,  SINT(steel,  return.
sugar,  oil,  dairy).
Liquidation  of  S PEs(SOMAT,  SOTOEA,
Agreon  nt with  IOA  on  sdtisf. SCOETO,  TOGOPIoE,  SOTCO)  with  6
div.  sche  euto  for  aprox.  10  more uniderway  (ITT,TOOTEX,  AGETU,
more  PIS  STA!  ICHE,  SOTOTOLES,  CAAM).
r PIs  awaiting  funding  for  debts
(ZOTO,  SALINTO.  SOTENNA,  TOGOPR0IT,
Cio  de  enin,SOtOESWIE,Le Moteur)
SAL  It:adootion  of  TOM  for
retrospective  review  of  Review detayod;  conditioaltieos
privatization  progrem  revised  by  Sank.
Jamica  SAL 1:  Dissolved  iJ. Omnibus.  Lard  divestiture  invotved  as
Program for  3  Ps:  JARC,  Ja.  wel
(Agric.  Sector  Omnibus,  lanane  Co.)  Oivested  Caribbeen  Cenot,  Watt..
Adj.  Operations  Co.uwrcial  Sank  wnd teltecolm.ic
Initiating  1zmo,  tions  of  Jaaica
11-88;  Adj.  Unoer
Changing Condi-  SAL t1:  Restructured  sugar  industry  (has
tions  8  891  Restructuring  of  sugar  invotved  closing  some  factories)
sector,  with  leasing  to
private  firm  Oivested  7 &agro-industrial  rid
agriculturat  Pe  (sate  of  assets  &
SAL t11:  logr-term  le ning)  1960-8a;  3 more
Oiv.  of  parts  of Banana  Co.  in  1989
SECAL:  TRANSJAN  pts.  discussions  ongoing.  DOelay  in  SECAL  2nd  trenche
Assess  ptz.  of TRANSJAN.  J.NL  JAC  operations  iproved/no  pt:.  lase  de  to  delay  tn  finat
& JRC  (transport);  JTC, JC,  necessary,.  reort of  PE assets  and L  iso.
(tel*com.);  Motel  Oceana.  J"  sold  Atlantic  ooeration.
iTC  sold  452  interest  (exceeds  iOvestiture  orogram,  it  some
Oivestiture  Progro_:  satisf.  cod1.).  cases,  exceecs  conoition  Li
progress  toward  achievemnt  JSC  ptz.  prep.  at  advanced  stage.
of  stated  div.  progro_,  with  Motel  Ocean  not  ptzd;  should
comipeted  div.  of 20  Pie  with  re4ace  tosses  thru  conversion  to
assets of at  least  J.S15O.  treining  facitity.
Sale  of 78X  of CCC (cement)
Sele  of  32 PEs  for M500..,  total
sale of  assts exceeds  J3s87.
Mexico  Satfsfactory  progress  in  Actions  prior  to  loan:
fiplpesntation  of Oisengage-  Of 706 PUs divested:
mont  Progrem  eonsisting  of  226  sotd
199 PIs.  78 merged
374 liquidated
28 transferred  to local  povts.
.9 Pst still  retained-43-
0IwVstTuuTE  OUTC@S
can't.
Lon  Effective  or
Loan/PR@ort  Trwche Targets  Status  Cants
Phtippines  Reform  Program  for  GCs:  In  alt,  122 GCs approved for  ptz.:  Privetilation  plans  for  severat
Offer  for  sate 30 targeted  29 0Cs privatized  (10 partially)  GCs still  nde  msy  hold wp
PEs.  7 offered  wuuccessfutly  2nd trmche  rlese  because  of
needed  r.A.
Finali2e  plans  for  100 PEs.  20 GCs  havo decision  pending
10 GCs have  boe  reviewd  for  final  T.A.  amd  studies  of  15 GCs  are
3rd  Tranche, offer  30 mare  recumndsti.  beirg  finmnce uder  USAID  grant.
PEC for  pOt.
Govt.  mnitoring  progra  so as to  About 130 GCS  are to  be abotish-
met  target  date of  August '89  for  ed,  reularized  or  converted to
the 20S  div.  repaired  for  tranche  private  fourdstion;  plans  for
release  20 are *treey  prepred,  but  100
total  are  nd  for  second
Govt. decision  to ptz.  302 of  trnche  retese.
Phlipoines  Matt.  lank  as of  6-89
Tunisia  Govt.  will  bring  to  saie  a  Sale of  6 hotels,  2 textilt  (SITER,  Govt.  aims at  div.  10 PCs  per
group of  PEs, satisf.  to  lank.  SITEX)  and  saller  holdings  (inc. yoer.  but  makes  no firim cawit-
3 construction  su*sidiaries  of  ment to  that  ninaer.
Stimit  review  including  latims"t).
further  candidates for  ptz.
Liq.  of  STIA (car  assaly).  5T
(mach. workshop) and  virtually  all
of  SOTENI's  iron  ore mines.PRF Working  Paper  Serias
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